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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF 
THE STATE OF UTAH 
FIRST EQUITY CORPORATION, 
a Florida corporation, 
Plaintiff-
Appellant, 
vs. 
UTAH STATE UNIVERSITY, 
a body politic and corporate, 
Defendant-
Respondent, 
and 
DONALD A, CATRON, an 
individual, 
Defendant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT I 
NATURE OF THE CASE I 
This is a suit by a stockbroker, First Equity Corporation 
of Florida ("First Equity") against two defendants, Utah State 
University ("USU") and Donald A. Catron ("Catron"), USU's I 
former investment officer, to recover damages allegedly suffered 
when First Equity accepted five orders to purchase stock placed 
with it by Catron without USU's authority and despite the opinion 
H 
CASE NO. 13798 
of the Utah Attorney General that USU had no statutory power 
to purchase stock; and then failed to deliver two of the orders 
within 3 5 days from the date of purchase (trade date). 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
After conducting discovery, including a deposition 
of Catron, First Equity moved for summary judgment against USU 
only. USU then filed a cross motion for summary judgment based 
solely on its affirmative defense that the orders for the pur-
chase of stock which Catron placed on behalf of USU were ultra 
vires in that USU had no power to purchase stock; and, there-
fore, USU had no obligation to pay for the stock or any 
commissions. The Court denied First Equity's motion and granted 
USU's cross motion. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
First Equity seeks reversal of the order denying its 
motion and a reversal of the order granting USU's cross motion. 
The amici seek the same relief but curiously also ask that the 
case be remanded for further proceedings. USU asks that both 
orders be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
A. Rule 75 (p) (2) Statement. 
First Equity and the amici brokers have set forth in 
their briefs separate statements of facts. In compliance with 
-2-
Rule 75(p)(2)' , USU indicates below to what extent appellant's 
statement is inconsistent with the facts. USU also indicates 
below the extent to which the statement of facts of the amici 
brokers is erroneous. 
3 
1. USU agrees in all material respects with that 
portion of First Equity's statement of facts designated by it 
as #1 and appearing on pages 2-4 of appellant's brief. 
2. USU agrees with all of that portion of First 
Equity's statement of facts designated as #2 and appearing on 
pages 4-7 of appellant's brief as far as it goes, except the 
full paragraph appearing on page 5 thereof. With respect 
to that paragraph: 
(a) it is incorrect to say that the decision by USU 
to open an account with a stockbroker was "generally trans-
mitted by telephone to the broker." The record is silent as to 
how such a decision was generally transmitted to a broker. 
Which states in relevant part: "If the respondent 
agrees with the statement of facts set forth in appellant's 
brief, he shall so indicate. If he controverts it, he shall 
state wherein such statement is inconsistent with the facts and 
shall make a statement of the facts as he finds them. . . . " 
2 
The statement of facts of the amici brokers largely 
parallels that of First Equity. 
3 
USU notes, however, that the "policy" adopted by its 
institutional council on June 26, 1971, is dissimilar from the 
four resolutions authorizing Catron to purchase stock in that 
the latter were directed to brokers, whereas the policy state-
ment was not. 
(b) It is incorrect to say that Catron "discussed his 
authority over the telephone with the broker and [Catron] con-
sidered it a 'mechanical1 matter to send the [corporate 
resolution dated January 20,,1972]." The record shows Catron's 
testimony in this regard to be far from certain (Deposition of 
Catron, pp. 74-75). 
Moreover, the question of whether First Equity saw a copy 
of the corporate resolution dated January 20, 1972, or learned 
of its contents is rendered more uncertain by the fact that 
First Equity admitted it could not find in its files a copy 
of said resolution and admitted that at no time did Catron 
advise it that his authority to purchase stock remained effective 
until written notice of the revocation of that authority was 
delivered to it (Record, pages 266, 300). Catron himself 
could not specifically remember sending a copy of the resolution 
to First Equity (D. 75-77, 83), and the files of USU reflect 
no correspondence from First Equity requesting confirmation 
of Catron's authority in writing and no correspondence from 
USU to First Equity suggesting that such authorization was 
sent. Indeed, the files contained no correspondence at all 
between USU and First Equity (R. 303). 
3. USU agrees with that portion of First Equityfs 
statement of facts designated as #3 as far as it goes. Catron 
ordered stock through First Equity for several reasons, one 
-4-
of which admittedly was that First Equity was slow in delivering 
certificates; but the initial reason Catron used First Equity 
was that it could give investment advice on certain promising 
Florida-based securities which advice Catron wanted to 
receive (D. 118-119, 219-220). 
4. USU disagrees with most of the portion of First 
Equity's statement of facts 'designated as #4 in its brief. 
USU never informed First Equity that it "would not accept 
delivery with respect to all five orders on the grounds that 
Catron was not authorized to purchase securities on behalf 
of USU." Rather, with respect to the orders for Natomas, 
Cordura, and Great Basin Petroleum, USU was initially ad-
vised that First Equity was willing to cancel those three 
orders (R. 342-343). Later USU was advised that First Equity 
was also willing to cancel a fourth order, that of Panelrama 
(R. 332) . USU only refused payment for the fifth order, that 
of Advanced Memory Systems ("AMS"), and stated as its grounds, 
inter alia, that Catron had no authority to buy any stock and 
that First Equity had not tendered delivery of the AMS within 
35 days from the trade date (R. 330-331). 
5. USU disagrees with much of that portion of First 
Equity's statement of facts designated as #5 and appearing on 
pp. 8-10 of its brief. First, there was nothing "secret" about 
the termination by USU of Catron's authority to purchase stock. 
-5-
That,termination was acccmplished at a meeting of the Investment 
Committee of USU's Institutional Council and was reflected 
in the minutes of that meeting (R. 317). Further, the fact 
of Catron's termination was noted in a special meeting of 
the USU Institutional Council on January 10, 1973, and re-
flected in the minutes of that meeting. Meetings of the 
Institutional Council are open to the public, and minutes 
of those meetings become matters of public record. Finally, 
Catron's authority from USU to purchase stock was drawn into 
question by the wide publicity given to the opinion of the 
Attorney General dated December 15, 1972, which publicity was 
to the effect that USU had no power to purchase stock (R. 
326-328, 337-340, 353-356). 
It is also inaccurate to suggest that the January 20, 
1972, corporate resolution adopted by USU's Institutional 
Council gave Catron authority which vis a vis First Equity 
was to remain in effect until written notice was delivered 
to First Equity. No matter how the resolution was worded, 
it could not have created any rights in First Equity if its 
contents were not communicated to First Equity. As noted above, 
serious doubts exist as to whether this was done. 
First Equity's statement that it received no notice of 
revocation of Catron's authority until March 19, 1973, is a 
self-serving conclusion of law. USU contends that First Equity 
received notice of Catron's revocation no later than December, 
1972, through its agents — the managers of the two Logan 
banks used as collecting banks by First Equity — reading 
the newspaper articles which reported that USU had no power 
to purchase stock (R. 326-328, 337-340, 353-356). 
While USUfs money was used to pay for stock ordered 
by Catron through First Equity after December 22, 1972, no 
member of the USU Administration or of the Investment 
Committee of the USU institutional Council knew that Catron 
was continuing to purchase stock through First Equity or in-
deed knew of the existence of First Equity until long after . 
the money had been paid. The only employees of USU who knew that 
Catron was ordering stock through First Equity were a few of 
Catron's subordinates (R. 311-312). 
6. USU disagrees with much of #6 of First Equity's 
statement of facts, appearing on pp. 10-12 of appellant's 
brief. In addition to the points of disagreement which already 
have been noted above (e.g., First Equity's contention that 
USU refused to accept delivery of all five orders of stock), 
First Equity imprecisely states that one of the grounds on 
which its motion for summary judgment was denied was that the 
court found a triable issue of fact as to whether USU had 
available any ffnon-public funds" to invest in common stock. . 
The court's order does not speak of "non-public funds." 
Rather, it noted a triable issue as to whether "USU, at the 
time Catron ordered the stock in question, or the time payment 
for said stock fell due, had funds which it had received from 
individual grants or development contracts sufficient to pay 
for part or all of said stock." Further, it said: "There is 
at least a triable issue uf fact" as to the foregoing (emphasis 
added) (R. 435 B). 
Finally, First Equity!s brief (p. 11, cf. p. 48) requires 
clarifications on damages. First Equity conceded after filing 
its complaint that Regulation T of the Federal Reserve Board 
limits its recoverable damages from USU on the Advanced Memory 
stock to $15,625.00, and that the figure of $37,045.27 is 
too high (R. 425). USU contends that nothing is recoverable. 
7. On page 3 of the amici brokers1 brief, it is 
stated that First Equity acted as agent for USU (as opposed 
to acting as a principal) in each of the five purchase 
transactions in question. Amici also state that Catron directed 
First Equity to purchase those five orders for USU. The 
implication is that Catron knew that First Equity would act 
as an agent. Amici, however/ omit mention of the fact that 
in two earlier transactions, First Equity acted as principal 
in selling stock to USU (R. 116). There is no evidence that 
when Catron placed orders for the five stocks in question, 
he knew or desired that First Equity would act as an agent 
in the transactions. 
B. Respondents Statement of Facts. 
As the trial court recognized in granting USUfs cross 
motion for summary judgment, the controlling facts of this 
lawsuit are few. Out of an abundance of caution, USU has set 
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forth many non-controlling facts above to counter the in-
accuracies and omissions of First Equity's lengthy statement. 
USU believes, however, the below statement of facts is 
sufficient to enable this court to decide this appeal: 
1. On behalf of USU Catron placed a number of stock 
purchase orders with First Equity beginning October 27, 1972 
(R. 99-149, 160-161). 
2. In placing each order, Catron instructed First 
Equity that payment would be made against delivery of the 
certificates at First Security Bank, Logan, in the case of 
some orders, and Walker Bank, Logan, in the case of other 
orders (R. 312-313). 
3. Except for those five orders noted below, payment 
was made for each order placed with First Equity by a sub-
ordinate of Catron delivering a check drawn on USU funds to 
one or the other of said banks (R. 311-313). 
4. On or about December 15, 1972, Larry Anderson and 
Fred Thompson, the managers respectively of the Logan branches 
of First Security Bank and Walker Bank, read in one or more 
of three newspapers serving Logan a report that the Attorney 
General was of the opinion that USU had no power to purchase 
stock1 (R. 326-328, 337-340, 353-356). 
The opinion itself concluded that USU could use certain 
funds (e.g. endowment funds) to purchase stock. None of the news 
paper reports mentioned this "exception." The bank managers read 
the newspaper reports but not the opinion. 
5. On January 17, 1973, Catron placed an order with 
First Equity for 5,000 shares, AMS, payment against delivery 
at First Security Bank, Logan. On March 13, 1973, the Ex-
change National Bank of Tampa sent certificates for 3,000 
shares to First Security Bank, Logan, in partial fulfillment 
of said order. The transmittal document which accompanied 
the 3,000 shares, and which was directed to First Security 
Bank, Logan, to the attention of Larry Anderson, contained 
these instructions: 
"For delivery to a/c Utah State 
University against payment of draft attached 
($67,019.00). Please credit our account 
with FEDERAL RESERVE BANK IN JACKSONVILLE 
FLORIDA THRU WIRE ADVICE ATTENTION of the 
undersigned." 
(R. 305, 307) 
USU refused to pay for these or any other AMS shares. 
6. On January 31, 1973, Catron placed an order with 
First Equity for 24,100 shares of Panelrama Corporation, pay-
ment against delivery at Walker Bank, Logan. Said stock was 
not tendered for delivery within 3 5 days thereof. 
7. On February 28, 1973, Catron placed the following 
orders with First Equity, payment against delivery at Walker 
Bank: 
55,700 Cordura (Computing & Software) 
83,800 Great Basins Petroleum 
13,000 Natomas 
-10-
8. First Equity voluntarily cancelled all of the 
above five purchase orders, except the order for AMS. (R. 
330-331, 342-343). This fact appears to be disputed by First 
Equity (R. 249-251). 
9. The diminution in value of the AMS stock between 
the trade date (January 17, 1973) and February 22, 1973 
(the 36th day after the trade date) was $15,625.00. (R. 424-
425). . 
10. The total commissions on the four orders which • 
were voluntarily cancelled by First Equity would have been 
$13,134.15 if the orders were legal, had not been cancelled 
and, in the case of Panelrama, there had not been a violation 
of Regulation T. The commission for AMS would have been 
$807.00 if the order had been valid, and there had been no 
violation of Regulation T. (R. 425). 
11. It is, a/t best, a disputed question of fact whether 
Catron or one of his subordinates ever sent to First Equity a 
copy of a corporate resolution dated January 20, 1971, purporting 
to authorize Catron to purchase stock for USU, which resolution 
was worded to "remain in full force and effect until written 
notice of the revocation hereof shall be delivered to the 
brokers." Catron can not specifically remember sending it 
(D. 75-77, 83). His secretary, v/ho handled his correspondence, 
cannot remember specifically sending it, although it is possible 
she did so (R. 3 21). Moreover, she would only send to a broker 
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a copy of the resolution if the broker requested written 
authority, and USUfs correspondence files show no copies 
of any correspondence whatsoever between USU and First 
Equity (R. 303,321). Finally, First Equity cannot find a 
copy of the resolution in its files (R. 266, 300). 
12. In December, 1972r USU revoked Catron's authority 
to purchase any stock by action which was reflected in minutes 
of the Investment Committee of its Institutional Council and 
of the Institutional Council itself (R. 310, 317). Appellant 
appears to deny this. • 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT BELOW PROPERLY GRANTED USU ! S MOTION 
FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
A. The Court Below Correctly Held That USU Had No Power To 
Purchase Stock And That The Five Purchase Orders In 
Question Were Ultra Vires. 
In Judge Christofferson's Memorandum Decision, he 
stated: 
"First, Utah State is alleged to have 
contracted with the plaintiff for the pur-
chase of certain stocks and have not paid 
for the same. This court holds that any con-
tracts by a public corporation which receives 
its authority for existence by the state can 
only enter into such contracts as are author-
ized by law and cannot obligate itself to 
spend public monies without such authoriza-
tion. The creation of Utah State by the 
Territorial Legislature provided no such 
authority or power to invest, nor does 
the Utah State Constitution. 
As to the statutory authority, Section 
33-1-1 and 33-1-3, Utah Code Annotated, 
provides what investments may be made by 
a public corporation or political or public 
body, and the court holds Utah State 
University comes within this definition and 
that the stocks in question do not fall with-
in the enumerated securities as set forth 
in that section, . . . " 
In its order granting USU's cross motion for summary judgment, 
the court held: 
11
. . • that plaintiff's complaint fails 
to state a claim upon which relief can be 
granted against USU in that it is barred 
by the provisions of the Utah Code pro-
hibiting the investment by state employees 
of funds in their custody in securities 
other than those enumerated in Utah Code 
§ 33-1-1." 
1. The Utah Constitution [and the 1888 Act] 
First Equity and the amici brokers urge that this order 
is contrary to the Utah Constitution. Amici assert USU has 
a "general grant of authority" with respect to state 
appropriated funds, which includes within it the power to 
purchase stock (p. 18, Amici brief). This "general" grant, 
it is contended, was originally conferred by section 4 of the 
1888 Act establishing USU; section 4 states that the trustees 
of the school shall have: 
" . . . general control and supervision 
. . . of all appropriations made by the 
Territory. . ." 
First Equity states that the "general authority" to con-
trol appropriations was perpetuated by Article X, Section 4 of the 
Constitution (p. 13, appellant's brief, cf. pp. 25-26) Amici 
have argued this point in related litigation. 
This "general authority" (appellant's brief, p. 13), the 
argument continues, became a premanent part of USUfs powers 
at statehood by reason of Article X, § 4 of the Utah 
Constitution, which provides, inter alia, that: 
" . . . all the rights, immunities, 
franchises and endowments heretofore 
granted or conferred [upon USU] are 
hereby perpetuated unto [USU]. . ." 
In order for this argument to prevail, it must be true both 
(1) that the 1888 Act conferred power on USU to buy stock; 
and (2) that this power was one of the rights, etc., "perpe-
tuated" by the State Constitution. However, both of these 
postulates are erroneous. That the 18 88 Act did not confer 
power on USU to purchase stock can be seen from a careful 
study of the Act itself. 
As to the contention that the Utah Constitution 
"perpetuated" this unlimited power to invest, a virtually 
identical argument was urged and soundly rejected in University 
of Utah v. Board of Examiners of State of Utah, 4 Utah 2d 
408, 295 P.2d 348. In that case, the University of Utah con-
tended it was completely free from the control of the Leg-
islature, administrative bodies, commissions, agencies and 
As will be seen, whatever investment powers were con-
ferred on USU by the Act were not perpetuated by the Constitution 
at Statehood. Therefore the question of what powers the 188 8 
Act conferred has become one of historical interest only and is 
not therefore treated in the body of this brief. The limited scope 
of the 1888 Act is discussed, however, in Appendix A. 
1 A 
officers of the State. After thoroughly canvassing the 
applicable Constitutional and statutory provisions and 
legislative history in a 33-page opinion, the Utah Supreme 
Court, through Justice Worthen, concluded, at p. 437: 
"Nothing in the arguments and debates in 
the Constitutional Convention on the educa-
tion article, (x) and more particularly, on 
Section 4, tends to suggest that it was con-
sidered by the delegates that the Legislature 
by said article would be prohibited from acting 
in respect to the University, except in 
matters of location and establishment. 
The entire thought of the convention in re-
spect to the University and Agricultural 
College was on the question of uniting them 
or leaving them separate, and on the question 
of location (emphasis added)." 
And again, at p. 43 8, the court stated: 
"Nowhere in the proceedings can an ex-
pression of intent be found that the Leg-
islature should forever be prohibited from 
acting in%any matters dealing with the 
purpose and government of the University 
except its establishment and location 
(emphasis added)." 
The court then focused on the most glaring weakness in the 
University of Utah's position. After quoting Section 1 and 2 
of Article X of the Constitution, which mandate the legislature 
to provide for the maintenance of the University of Utah 
[and USU ), the Court states, at pp. 439-440: 
"Would it be contended by the University 
that under Article X, Section 1, it might 
compel the Legislature to appropriate money 
the University considers essential? Is it 
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contended that the demands of the Univer-
'•••"•'"•. sity are not subject to constitutional debt 
limits? If, so, respondent would have the 
power to destroy the solvency of the State 
and all other institutions by demands beyond the 
power of the State to meet (emphasis added).11 •• / ' 
One might add that this power to destroy the solvency of the 
State would be greater if USU had unlimited power to invest 
or speculate with the appropriations it receives. 
The court then quotes in full Sections 5 and 7 of 
Article X of the Constitution, which provide, respectively, 
that the proceeds of the sale of lands reserved by Congress 
for the University of Utah shall constitute permanent funds 
of the State, and that all public school funds shall be 
guaranteed by the State against loss or diversion. Then the 
court concludes, at p. 440: 
•"It is inconceivable that the framers 
of the Constitution in light of the 
provisions of Sections 1, 5, and 7 of 
Article X, and the provision as to debt 
limitations, intended to place the University 
above the only controls available for the 
people of this State as to the property, 
management and government of the University. 
We are unable to reconcile respondent's 
position that the University has a blank check 
as to all its funds with no pre-audit and no 
restraint under the provisions of the Con-
stitution requiring the State to safely invest 
and hold the dedicated funds and making the 
State guarantor of the public school funds 
against loss or diversion. To hold that 
respondent has free and uncontrolled custody 
and use of its property and funds while making the 
State guarantee said funds against loss or 
diversion, is i nconceivable. We believe 
that the framers of the Constitution intended 
no such result (emphasis added)." 
The appeal at bar is plainly controlled by the afore-
discussed decision. Article X, Section 4, mentions USU in the 
same phrase as the University of Utah. That the framers of the 
Constitution, by Article X, Section 4, intended to "perpetuate" 
to USU the right to invest or speculate at will with State 
appropriations (assuming, arguendo, that the 18 88 Act conferred tha 
right initially) and at the same time intended to guarantee all 
public school funds against loss is "inconceivable," to quote from 
Justice Worthen, supra. It is even more so when one considers 
Further, to interpret Section 4 of Article X so as to 
perpetuate the right of USU to "control and supervise state appro-
priations" (being deemed to include the right to invest or specu-
late with those appropriations in anything) would be inconsistent 
with Section 5 of Article X, ks noted in the University of Utah 
case, supra. That Section provides: 
"The proceeds of the sale of lands reserved 
by an act of Congress, approved February 21, 
1855, for the establishment of the University 
of Utah, and of all the lands granted by an 
act of Congress, approved July 16, 1894, [which 
went to USU] shall constitute permanent funds, 
to be safely invested and held by the State; and 
the income thereof shall be used exclusively for 
the support and maintenance of the different 
institutions and colleges, respectively, in 
accordance with the requiremenrs ana conditions 
of said acts of Congress, (emphasis added)" 
By Section 5, the State alone has power to hold and invest the cor-
pus consisting of proceeds of the sale of certain lands, and even 
then the State does not have unlimited p-.^ wer to invest but must 
do so safely. In contrast, the income from the corpus is to be 
used "exclusively for the support and maintenance" of USU in 
accordance with the requirements of the act of Congress granting 
those lands. Thus, the Constitution, in Section 5, expressly pro-
hibits USU from investing income from the corpus of a permanent 
fund in even safe securities, or indeed from using that income for 
any purpose except for its support and maintenance; however, ap-
pellant would urge that the Constitution, at the same time (in 
Section 4), empowers USU to invest or speculate with state appro-
priations in anything. This court should not infer such inconsis-
down on this right, it having become frozen into the Consti-
tution. 
2. General Principles of Public Law and Utah's Statutory 
Scheme Governing Public investments. 
Appellant and amici- also assert that one or more 
statutes passed since 1896 confer on USU unlimited power to 
invest some or all of its funds. Before examining these stat-
utes, the following general principles should be reviewed: 
a. USU Is A Public Corporation Which Possesses Only Such 
Powers to Contract As Have Been Conferred Upon It By 
Statute. 
(1) Treatises. 
Since 1929, USU has been a "body politic and corporate." 
Section 53-32-2, Utah Code Annotated (1953). As such, it is subject 
to the rule that governmental entities possess only those powers 
to contract which have been conferred upon them. McQuillin states 
•the rule governing "school authorities" like USU as follows: 
"... the prevailing rule is that such body 
can enter into such contracts only as it is 
empowered, expressly or impliedly, to make 
and enforce /citing 21 cases from 15 jurisdic-
tions/. That is to say, school boards or school 
districts cannot contract ad libitum, ^as individuals 
may do, but only respecting objects in the mode 
and to the extent the law permits //citing more 
cases/ " 16 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations 
(1972 Rev. Volume) Section 46.07c, pp. 679-680.2 
Note that the rule is said to be applicable to "school authorities," 
not just school districts or boards. 
l"At pleasure; as one wishes; as far as one desires." Webster1s 
New Collegiate Dictionary. 
2McQuillin, in footnote 1 to Section 46.07c, quoted above, refers 
the reader to Chapter 29 of his treatise. Chapter 29 deals with 
the powers to contract possessed by municipal corporations strictly 
speaking. Thus, McQuillin recognizes that the rule governing 
"school authorities" quoted above is the same as the rule—sometimes 
called Dillonfs Rule—governing municipal corporations. 
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See, also, Yokley on Municipal Corporations, where it 
is said, at Section 385, p. 302: 
"A school district has been referred to as 
a corporation having the most limited powers 
known to the law." 
(2) Cases. 
In Regents of the University of Nebraska v. McConnell, 
5 Neb. 423, 428 (1877), it was said that the governing board of 
that university (like USU, a land grant college) "acts simply by 
delegated authority, and can exercise only such powers as are 
expressly given to it, or which may be necessary to carry into 
effect those powers specially given." 
Public quasi-corporations, like USU,-1- have long been 
held by the courts to possess only those powers derived from 
statute. In Grabe v. Lamro Independent Consolidated School 
District, 221 N.W. 697,698 (S.D., 1928), it was said: 
"... it is well established that the powers 
of /public quasiy corporations are limited to 
those granted by statute." 
The approach of common law in interpreting legislative 
grants of power to public bodies concerning the handling of public 
monies is illustrated by National Surety v. State, 239 P.257, 
260 (Okl., 1925), a case involving the question of whether a county 
lnA public corporation which is not municipal is one created by 
the state solely as its own device and agency ... a state university 
... and a state board of education constitute, if incorporated, 
illustrations of this class. Because the independent powers of such 
corporations are frequently nominal, or small, ... and their officers 
and members (if any) have no individual interest in them, these 
organizations are sometimes described ... as public quasi corpora-
tions. " 1 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations (1971 Rev. Vol.) 
Section 2.03(b) p. 133. 
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treasurer, under a statute empowering him to sell bonds in-
itially purchased with county sinking funds, had power to 
reinvest the proceeds of sale in similar bonds. In holding 
that he did not, the court stated, at p. 260: 
"It seems certain that, in the absence of 
statutory authority to invest the sinking 
funds in his hands, it was the duty of the 
county treasurer to preserve the sinking funds 
which came into his official hands intact in money. 
Before the custodian of the sinking fund could 
invest such fund in any manner, he must be able to 
put his finger upon some express statutory provi-
sion which would authorize the investment... ." 
(3) Cases involving municipal corporations. 
USU also relies by analogy on the myriad of cases 
involving municipalities and school districts. This elementary 
principle has been held by the United States Supreme Court to 
apply to municipal corporations. 
"Such corporations ... may exert only such 
powers as are expressly granted to them, or 
such as may be necessarily implied from those 
granted... . They may be created, ... their 
powers may be restricted ... or altogether with-
drawn at the will of the legislature." Atkin v. 
Kansas, 191 U.S. 207, 220, 48 L.Ed. 148, 157 
(1903). 
A tendency to narrowly interpret grants of legislative power 
to municipalities is also seen in Town of Worland v. Odell & 
Johnson, 329 P.2d 797, 803 (Wyo., 1958): 
"... all the courts, without a single 
exception so far as we know, agree that a 
municipality has only such powers as are 
granted to it by the legislature. That 
itself seems to mean that a power not granted 
is a power prohibited. As stated in Van Eaton 
v. Town of Sidney, 211 Iowa 986, 231 N.W. 475, 
477, 71 A.L.R., 820, citing numerous cases: . 
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'Where a statute confers certain specific 
powers/ those not enumerated are withheld. 
In other words, enumeration of powers operates 
to exclude such as are not enumerated.f (emphasis 
added)" 
Finally, the Utah Supreme Court has held that municipal powers 
cannot lightly be inferred by implication. In Moss ex rel 
State Tax Commission v. Board of Commissioners of Salt Lake 
City, 1 Ut. 2d 60, 261 P.2d 961, 964 (1953), it said: 
"This court has not favored the extension 
of the powers of the city by implication, and 
the only modification of such doctrine is where 
the power is one which is necessarily implied. 
Unless this requirement is met, the power can-
not be deduced from any consideration of convenience 
or necessity, or desirability of such result, and 
no doubtful inference from other powers granted 
or from ambiguous or uncertain provisions of the 
law would be sufficient to sustain such authority." 
b. Principles of statutory construction regarding 
power to invest. 
In considering whether any power to purchase stock 
has been conferred upon'USU, the following excerpt from a lead-
ing authority should be borne in mind: 
"The right to make contracts for the purchase 
of such essentials as office supplies, coal, 
and similar needs covering its ordinary require-
ments is clearly necessary to enable the munici-
pality to carry out the purposes for which it 
was created and the power to so contract is im-
plied from such purposes. However, the right 
of a municipality to enter into contracts for 
products or services other than the usual 
necessities, such as the purchase of automobile 
testing equipment when no authority to test 
automobiles exists, contracts for housing of 
veterans and their families, and similar con-
tracts covering activities not customarily engaged 
in by cities, raises legal questions of a novel 
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character and the courts adopt a strict, 
rather than a liberal construction of the 
powers of a municipality and any ambiguity 
or doubts as to the: existence of the extent of 
the grant of power will be resolved against its 
existence or expansion... . In considering con-
tracts of public corporations, the courts apply 
the ultra vires rule with a greater degree of 
strictness than in the case of private corpora-
tions inasmuch as the rights and interests of 
the citizens of the municipality are directly in-
volved and the question of public policy arises." 
(emphasis added). Rhyne, Charles S., Municipal 
Law, Section 10-2, 3, pp. 256-258. 
See, also, Hoskins v. City of Orlando, 51 F.2d 901, 904 (5th Cir.). 
In examining Utah statutes to ascertain whether they 
empower USU to purchase stock, we must also start with the 
common law presumption that a public corporation may not acquire 
property or spend money for investment or speculation. Hoskins 
v. City of Orlando, supra; Powell v. Birmingham, 61 So.2d 11, 18 
(Ala., 1952); National Surety v. State, supra; Gilbert v. City of 
Dayton, 59 N.E. 2d 954, 955 (Ohio Ct. App., 1944); Baker v. City 
of Palo Alto, 12 Cal. Rptr. 425, 430 (D.C.A., 1961); 63 C.J.S. 
Section 959, pp. 508-509; Rhyne, supra, Section 16-6, p. 374; 10 
McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 3d Ed. (1966 revised volume) 
Section 28.11, p. 26. 
c. Utah statutory scheme governing investments by 
state agencies. 
As recognized by the court below, any analysis of 
Utah statutes on the subject of investments by state agencies 
must begin with Sections 33-1-1 and 33-1-3, Utah Code Annotated 
(1953), both of which were enacted as part of the same act in 1939. 
Section 33-1-1 provides simply that investment by certain 
enumerated entities in certain enumerated securities "shall 
be lawful,11 The entities" enumerated are virtually all 
either public entities or entities which are strictly regu-
lated by government, such as receivers, insurance companies, 
^Section 33-1-1 also contains the following: "•.. the 
investment by any private, political or public instrumentality, 
body, corporation or person of their own funds or funds in 
their possession in /the enumerated securities/ be 
lawful (emphasis added.)'1 That the Legislature should feel it 
necessary to declare investment by private persons in these secur-
ities to be lawful seems unnecessary at first glance. Section 
33-1-3, however, suggests a reason why this was done. The first 
sentence of Section 33-1-3, which was enacted as part of the 
same act as Section 33-1-1, provides that wherever state law 
requires either a deposit of securities or the posting of a bond 
with security, the securities enumerated in Section 33-1-1 shall 
be acceptable as security "without other security." The post-
ing of bonds with security or the deposit of securities pursuant 
to state law is something which is almost exclusively done by pri-
vate persons; hence, the purchase of the securities enumerated in 
Section 33-1-1 by a private person is lawful in that it meets any 
requirements as to the posting of a bond with security or the 
deposit of securities. 
The title of S. B. 158 (Laws of Utah, 1939) enacting 
Section 33-1-1 supports the above interpretation in that (1) it 
does not mention private entities as those authorized by the 
Act to invest in the enumerated securities and (2) it describes 
that part of the Act relating to securities which are acceptable 
for bonds and deposits of securities in language that encompasses 
posting of bonds and deposit of securities by all entities, including 
private persons and corporations. The title of an act may possibly 
be used under certain circumstances in construing a statute, if 
the latter is ambiguous. American Smelting & Refining Co. v. 
State Tax Commission, 16 Utah 2d 147, 397 P.2d 67, 70 (1964). 
The title to S. B. 158 is a particularly useful tool in 
interpreting the bill because the title itself was twice amended 
during the passage of the bill. Senate Journal, 1939, pp. 237, 529. 
The full title to S. B. 158 is set forth as Appendix B. 
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The securities enumerated aro all government guaranteed 
securities such as "bonds and other obligations of ... the 
United States." There is no question but what USU is a 
"public corporation" or "political, or public ... body (or) 
corporation" within the meaning of Section 33-1-1. There is also 
no question but what the securities in question in this lawsuit 
(stocks) do not fall within the enumeration of securities set 
forth in that section. 
Section 33-1-3, states in relevant part: 
"The provisions of this act are supple- . 
mental to any and all other laws relating to 
and declaring what shall be legal investments 
for the persons, corporations, organizations 
and officials referred to in this act... . 
(emphasis added)." 
It is apparent that in enacting Section 31-1-3 the Legislature 
envisioned situations where certain governmental entities of 
the kind mentioned in Section 3 3-1-1 might be empowered to in-
vest in securities of a'type not enumerated in Section 33-1-1. 
Further, the language of Section 33-1-3, quoted above, was worded 
to include within its meaning any laws which the Legislature 
might enact thereafter. Subsequent to the enactment of Section 
33-1-3, the Legislature has enacted the following code sections 
containing, in most cases, detailed statutory definitions of 
what are legal investments for the state agency or regulated 
"industry" specified therein: 
Indeed, in 1939, when Sections 33-1-1 and 33-1-3 were enacted, 
the State Land Board already possessed statutory power to invest 
its funds in securities not enumerated in Section 33-1-1, e.g., 
"state, county, city or school district bonds." 
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Agency or "Industry" Utah Code Sections (1953) 
Utah State Retirement 49-9-12 
Board 
Fiduciaries (E.G., 
executors) 7-5-11 
Insurance Companies 31-13-1, et seq. 
Department of Finance 63-2-34 
State Land Board 65-1-65 (present, 
statute) 
However, no statute enacted prior or subsequent to 1939 defines 
what types of securities USU may legally invest in. 
From the above, it is clear that while the Legislature 
on numerous occasions has granted other state agencies power to 
invest in securities not set forth in Section 33-1-1, it has granted 
no such power to USU. Applying the principles of statutory con-
struction set forth above, it must be concluded that USU had no 
power from the Legislature to invest in stock. 
3. Statutes Enacted Sihce Statehood. 
The statutes relied upon by appellant follow, together 
with USU's arguments showing that reliance to be misplaced: 
a. The 1929 Act 
Amici cite language from Section 15, Chapter 41, Laws of 
Utah (1929).1 However, as amici concede, that section was re-
pealed in 1969, making it completely irrelevant to this appeal. 
"The Board shall have the general control and supervision ... of 
all appropriations .... and also of lands or personal property that 
may be hereafter donated ... ." 
-?R~ 
Appellant cites other language from the 1929 Act — 
now Section 53-32-4, Utah Code Annotated (1953)2 ~ which 
was in effect during the period in question. It contends that 
this section empowers USU to invest all property received by 
private donation in any form of investment whatever including stock. 
To construe this section as authorizing USU to invest that 
category of funds in any and all kinds of securities is to 
disregard the language of Section 33-1-3, discussed on pp. 
22-25, supra. That section envisions that other laws would 
supplement and refine those laws empowering agencies to invest. 
Section 53-32-4 is not the kind of law envisioned by Section 
33-1-3 in that it does not declare "what shall be legal investments." 
In other words, Section 53-32-4 by itself does not empower USU 
to invest these monies; it only makes them available for invest-
ment in "legal investments" as otherwise "declared" by legis-
lation. To read Section 53-32-4 as defendants contend would logic-
ally require the court to hold that the category of funds des-
cribed therein could be legally invested in anything; such a con-
struction flies in the teeth of the common law presumption that a 
^"The Utah State Agricultural College (Utah State University 
of Agriculture and Applied Science) ... may take by purchase, 
grant, gift, devise or bequest any property real or personal 
for the use of any department of the college and for any purpose 
appropriate to the objects of the college. It may convert 
property received by gift, grant, devise or bequest and not 
suitable for its uses into other property or into money. Such 
property so received or converted shall be held, invested and 
managed and the proceeds thereof used by the board of trustees 
for the purposes and under the conditions prescribed in the 
grant or donation." 
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municipal corporation may not: spend money for speculation, 
and the public law canon of construction that powers to 
contract for items other than necessaries shall be strictly 
construed. See pp. 21-22 of this Brief. 
The fact that the monies referred to in Section 53-32-4 
have not been appropriated by the Legislature, but rather come 
from other sources, does not render inapplicable the common 
law rule that a public body has only those powers specifically 
conferred upon it by statute. 
In State ex rel Davis v. Clausen, 160 Wash. 618, 295 
Pac. 751, 757 (1931), the court held that federal monies intended 
for Washington State College but received by the state treasurer 
were subject to a Washington statute prohibiting the state 
treasurer from transferring monies to the college without a 
legislative appropriation, notwithstanding statutory language 
providing that monies received from the United States for the 
benefit of the college, when deposited with the treasurer, 
"... shall be held as special funds for 
said college, and are hereby appropriated to 
the uses and purposes for which the same are 
received. " 
The court held that money coming into the custody of the state 
treasurer, although specifically earmarked for the use of 
the State College and by statute "appropriated to the uses and 
purposes" of the college, partook of the same character as 
monies received by the state treasurer from state appropriations 
in the sense that only a legislative appropriation could 
authorize the treasurer to disburse them out to the college. 
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In Mahon v. Board of Education of City of New York, 
63. N.E. 1107 (N.Y., 1902), the court held that a constitutional 
provision forbidding any city to give money in aid of any 
individual applies to money the city received from sources other 
than public taxation. 
In Storen v. Sexton, 209 Ind. 589, 200 N.E. 251 (1936), 
the Indiana Supreme Court squarely held that monies donated to 
Purdue University (a land grant college, like USU) were to 
be treated the same as state funds once they were received; 
therefore, they could only be spent as the Legislature directed. 
The court reasoned, at p. 261, as follows: 
"When the trustors created the trusts and 
placed them in the hands of public officers they 
must be deemed to have understood that the dis-
cretion of those officers concerning the details 
of safeguarding and preserving the corpus of the 
trust, and insuring the safety and availability 
of current funds, could be and might be controlled 
by the Legislature." 
See also State ex reL University of Utah v. Candland, 
36 U't. 406, 425-426, 104 Pac. 285 (1909); University of North 
Carolina v. Maultsby, 43 N.C. 257, 264 (1852); and Trustees of 
the University of Alabama v. Winston, 5 Stewart & P. 17 (Ala.. 
1833) to the effect that property owned by state controlled uni-
versities (like USU) is actually property of the state. 
b. The Higher Education Act of 1969. 
(1) State appropriations. Another statute relied 
on as granting USU power to invest state appropriations in 
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stock is Section 53-48-10 (c<) ,1 enacted as part of the Higher 
Education Act of 1969. Amici concede (p. 17, amici brief), 
that the language they rely on is not specific; indeed, they 
suggest that the Legislature consciously avoided being speci-
fic.2 Thusf it is conceded that reliance on this statute con-
tradicts the canon of statutory construction that legislation 
purporting to grant public bodies power to contract other than 
for necessaries is to be strictly constructed. The untena-
bility of appellant's reliance on this statute is underscored by 
the realization that if the phrase "handle its own financial af-
fairs" imports within it the power to invest in stock, it also 
includes the power to invest in any form of investment or 
speculation; and further by the fact that these unlimited powers 
to invest or speculate with state monies would be held not only 
by each of the seven state colleges and universities in the state 
but also by each of the two technical colleges. To ascribe an 
intent to the Legislature to clothe every small college and 
technical school in the state with a power that could so easily 
result in the total loss of tens of millions of dollars stretches 
credulity to its breaking point. 
llfEach university and college and the Utah Technical College 
at Provo and the Utah Technical College at Salt Lake may do 
its own purchasing, issue its own payrolls, and handle its own 
financial affairs, under the general supervision of the board 
as provided in this act (emphasis theirs)." 
2Their exact language is: 
"... the Utah Legislature avoided a specification of how 
the University should handle its finances when it reiterated the 
University's general authority to manage its finances in a 1969 
Act (Utah Code Ann., Section 53-48-10 (5) (1953))." 
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By way of background, the Higher Education Act of 1969, 
of which Section 53-48-10 (5) is a part, created the pre-
decessor body to the Utah Board of Regents. The Act is 
concerned with dividing duties between the Board of Regents, 
on the one hand, and the universities and colleges, on the 
other. Handling one's "own financial affairs under the general 
supervision of the Board" was said to be the duty of the 
universities and colleges. By "financial affairs," the 
Legislature appears to have intended to mean matters such 
as purchasing and issuing payrolls, the two specific functions, 
mentioned in the same list of powers as the phrase "handle 
its own financial affairs." In other words, the rule of ejusdem 
generis governs in construing what is meant by handling one's 
"own financial affairs." This rule of construction is defined 
in Black's Law Dictionary, 4th Ed., as follows: 
"In the construction of laws ... where 
general words follow an enumeration of persons 
or things, by words of a particular and specific 
meaning, such general words are not to be construed 
in their widest extent, but are to be held as ap-
plying only to persons or things of the same general 
kind or class as those specifically mentioned." 
(2) Research and Development Funds. Appellant 
relies on Section 53-48-20 (3)1 (also part of the 1969 Act) for 
the proposition that USU has power to invest in stock any monies 
^Appellant sets forth part of the statutory language on 
p. 15 of its brief. Section 53-48-20(2), not quoted by appellant, 
makes it clear that the statute is referring at this point only, 
to research and development funds. 
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derived from nonstate sources for research or development. 
Again, the logic of its proposition compels the result that 
USU has power to invest or speculate with these monies in 
anything. Subsection (3)(d) of that section does authorize 
USU as well as every other "institution, college, or depart-
ment or its foundation or organization" to invest the research 
monies referred to in the section. However, Section 53-48-20 
(3)(d) is not a law "relating to and declaring what shall be 
legal investments" for USU as envisioned by Section 33-1-3; 
Section 53-48-20 (3) (d) merely makes available for investment 
in "legal investments" (as otherwise declared by legislation) 
a narrow category of funds - funds of a nature which, absent 
this authorization, might be thought to be unavailable for any 
type of investment. 
4. Proper Interpretation of 33-1-1 
Appellant and amici contend that the trial court in-
correctly construed Section 33-1-1 as an enabling statute.1 
Amici argue that the section "is simply declarative of the pre-
sumptive legality of certain investments without being ex-
clusive (p. 19, amici brief)." Appellant apparently urges the 
same interpretation.2 
1This lengthy section is quoted in full in an appendix to the 
brief of amici and on pp. 18-19 of appellant!s brief. 
2"... Section 33-1-1 was enacted as a legal list to declare 
presumptively legal investments for persons entrusted with 
investment responsibilities." (p. 25, app. brief). 
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That § 33-1-1 is an enabling statute is clear when one 
considers the language of § 33-1-3 that "Whenever. . . a 
deposit of securities is required, . . the securities made legal 
investments by this act shall be acceptable" and stating further 
that the "provisions of this act are supplemental to any and all 
other laws relating to and declaring what shall be legal invest-
ments for the. . . corporations. . . referred to in this act. . . 
(emphasis added)." The only part of the act which could be said to 
make or declare "what shall be legal investments for the . . . 
corporations. . . referred to in the act. . ." is § 33-1-1. See 
also § 33-1-4 and 33-1-4.1. That § 33-1-1 was believed to be an 
enabling statute by the legislature is seen from the title of the 
bill enacting it (S.B. 158, 1939) which reads: "An Act Authorizing 
Insurance Companies, . . . to Invest in Bonds Issued by the 
United States, . . . " See Appendix B for complete title. 
The title to S.B. 158 is especially helpful in showing the 
Legislature intended § 33-1-1 to be an enabling provision because 
of the care the title received, having been amended twice during 
the course of the bill's passage. Senate Journal, 1939, pp. 237, 
529. 
Appellant argues in favor of its interpretation of 
§33-1-1 by reference to the law governing trusts and private 
fiduciaries (p. 22, app. brief). However, § 33-1-1 has nothing to 
do with the law of trusts or the "prudent man rule" of § 33-2-1 
which was not enacted until 1951. * 
" ^Two major works have compiled all code sections of Utah 
law (and the law of other states) bearing on what are "legals" for 
private fiduciaries. Bogurt, Trusts and Trustees, 2d ed. § 657;3 
CCH Blue Sky Law Reporter, 43,7 01. Neither of these mentions 
§ 33-1-1 in its compilation. 
Finally, amici suggest that this case be remanded 
to take factual evidence as to how Utah colleges have inter-
preted § 33-1-1 to assist the court in construing it (p. 18, 
amici brief). However, appellant did not offer any evidence 
on this below and does not urge on appeal that the case be 
remanded. If there was error in not conducting a factual 
inquiry, it was invited error. Moreover, such a factual in-
quiry is helpful in statutory construction only where the 
statute is ambiguous. Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Anderson, • 
30 Utah 2d 102, 514 P.2d 217 (1973). 
5. Money Management Act of 1974. 
Appellant and amici argue that the passage of the 
197 4 Money Management Act proves the court below erred in con-
struing § 33-1-1 to be an enabling provision. 
First, they urge that the fact the 197 4 Act amends 
specific sections of the Utah Code, but does not amend 
§ 33-1-1, somehow comports with their contention that said 
section is "declarative of the presumptive legality of certain 
investments without being exclusive." This is a non sequitur. 
They also suggest that the fact the Act does not amend § 3 3-1-1 
shows that the section is not an enabling provision; this 
also does not follow. 
Secondly, amici attempt to make some point from the 
fact that Section 4 of the Act does not transfer to the state 
1 
Appellant nakedly asserts in its brief (p. 16) that "USU 
and other Utah Universities have had a long history of investing in 
common stock. . ." Since appellant did not offer any evidence be-
low to show this, and since clearly the production of such evidence 
was within its control, this court may draw an inference that the 
evidence would have been nnfavnr^hlp +-r> Pircf T?mn +-xr -D™.^ TT 
treasurer investment powers over certain funds, including 
certain funds of member institutions of the state system of 
higher education. What point they wish to make from this 
fact is not clear. 
Thirdly, amici urge that the fact these college 
funds can be invested in securities not enumerated in § 33-1-1 
suggests the Legislature did not regard § 33-1-1 as an enabling 
provision. But this contention stubbornly ignores the plain 
language of § 33-1-3 which makes clear that § 33-1-1 is not . 
exclusive. 
Finally, amici deduce from one of the stated purposes 
of the 1974 Act that § 33-1-1 is not an enabling provision 
since if it were, a "statewide policy for the deposit and in-
vestment of public funds" would already be present and there 
would be no need for a "new" policy (the word "new" is not 
in the Act). This argument is defective in that (1) nowhere 
does the Act suggest that there was no pre-existing law governing 
the deposit and investment of public funds; indeed the Act 
specifically amends many pre-existing sections of the Code 
dealing with the deposit and investment of public funds (e.g. 
§ 65-1-65) and (2) the phrase "establish. . . a policy" does 
not logically preclude the prior existence of a different 
"To establish and maintain a continuing statewide 
policy for the deposit and investment of public funds." 
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policy. Further, this court can take judicial notice that 
for years the Legislature has sought to bring the investment 
functions of various state agencies under a centralized source 
and to that end enacted the Money Management Act of 1969, 
later declared unconstitutional. But this does not mean 
there was no prior policy. 
The 1969 Act, far from disproving, merely confirms 
that § 33-1-1 is an enabling provision. 
B. Judge Christofferson Did Not Find A Triable Issue Of 
Fact In Granting USU's Cross Motion. 
Appellant and amici argue that the court below found 
a genuine issue of fact as to whether there were enough 
monies legally "available" to USU for investment in stock 
at the time the five orders were placed. They misconstrue 
the effect of the court's two separate orders. In the order 
denying First Equity's motion, the court stated three separate 
grounds, basing its order on each of them. One £md only one) 
of the grounds was: 
"There is at: least a triable issue of 
fact whether USU [had grant or contract 
money sufficient to pay for the stock] 
(emphasis added)." 
The words "at least" suggest the court had doubts as to whether 
grant or contract monies were lawfully available to purchase stock. 
For purposes of denying First Equity's motion, however, the court 
did not have to decide this legal question. Moreover, in light 
of the other two grounds it gave for denying First Equity's motion, 
the court's reference to a possible triable issue of fact was 
unnecessary. 
In his order granting USUfs Cross Motion, however, 
Judge Christofferson gave only one ground; namely, that USU 
could not invest any funds in its custody in stock. In thus 
granting USU's motion, the court below had to decide, whether 
grant or contract monies were lawfully available to invest, 
in stock. Its decision was they were not. 
What appellant really contends is that the language 
of the order granting USUfs motion is inconsistent with 
certain language of Judge Christoffersenfs memorandum decision. 
By way of response, first, Judge Christoffersen did not say 
in his memorandum that there was a triable issue of fact; 
he only said "assuming that there was authority for the 
university to invest those [grant or contract] funds, it 
would be a triable issue of fact as to what funds there might 
have been that fell within this category." Sedond, it should 
be remembered that in his single memorandum decision, Judge 
Christoffersen explained both his grounds for denying First 
Equity's motion for summary judgment and his ground for 
granting USUfs cross motion for summary judgment. The 
order granting USU's motion made no reference to a possible 
triable issue of fact. 
Third, it is elementary that "Where it is reasonably 
possible to do so, such construction should be adopted as will 
give force and effect to the judgment, will make it servicable 
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instead of useless, and will support rather than destroy it.11 
46 Am Jur 2d, Judgments § 74, p. 364. Hubble v. Cache County 
Drainage Dist., 123 Utah 405, 410 (1953). • 
Fourth, even assuming an inconsistency, the language 
of the order displaces the language of the memorandum decision. 
Indeed, "the opinion of a judge upon matters submitted, whether 
oral or in writing, does not necessarily form a part of the 
judgment proper. It is only what a court adjudicates, and not 
what it says in an opinion, that has any direct legal effect." 
46 Am Jur 2d, Judgments § 6, pp. 316-317. The order was pre-
pared by USU at the court1s direction with a copy of the proposed 
order being served on First Equity so that it might object 
if it felt the order did not properly reflect the court's views. 
No objection was made by First Equity before the order was 
signed. 
C. The Court Below Correctly Held That An Ultra Vires Contract 
Cannot Be Enforced Against a Public Entity. 
It is well settled in Utah, that where a public entity 
has undertaken to enter a contract which was wholly outside the 
power of the entity to make, such a contract is void and cannot 
be enforced against the entity. 
In News Advocate Pub. Co. v. Carbon County, 7 2 Utah 88f 
269 P. 129, 130, the Carbon County Clerk caused to be published 
in plaintiff newspaper a notice of sale of property on which 
taxes were delinquent. Defendant county/ on receiving the 
publication bill, refused payment. In defending a suit 
brought for the amount of the bill, defendant urged (1) that 
the Clerk had received no authority from the county commission 
to authorize the publication, and (2) even if he had, the 
contract was ultra vires because the county commissioners 
had no statutory power to confer such an authorization. The 
first defense was said to be unavailable based on the facts 
in the record. Finding the second defense dispositive of 
the case, the court held for the defendant, saying: 
"The general principle or rule of law that 
municipal corporations are not bound by con-
tracts made without authority or in excess 
of the powers of such corporations is conceded. 
The rule applicable is stated in 15 C.J. 
540, as follows: 
!A county is not bound by a contract beyond 
the scope of its powers or foreign to its 
purposes, or which is outside of the authority 
of the officers making it. In this connection 
it is the rule that the authority of a county 
board to make contracts is strictly limited 
to that conferred, either expressly or impliedly, 
by statute, regardless of benefit to the county 
or of value received; and the same is true as to 
other county officers attempting to contract in 
behalf of the county. * * * All persons dealing 
with officers or agents of counties are bound 
to ascertain the limits of their authority or 
power as fixed by statutory or organic law, 
and are chargeable with knowledge of such limits. 
No estoppel can be created by the acts of such 
agents or officers in excess of their statutory 
or constitutional powers.1 
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The same rule or principle is announced both in 
McQuillan [sic] and Dillon on Municipal 
Corporations. (emphasis added)." 
The amici here have previously attempted to distinguish 
the Carbon County case by a not very convincing exercise in 
semantics. They have urged that in that case, plaintiff 
publisher could not recover on its printing bill from the 
County because the printing contract had been entered into 
contra to a specific statutory provision. But a careful 
reading of that case discloses no statute prohibiting the 
county from contracting with a printer to advertise a notice-
of sale where the county did not have power to sell the land. 
That the court based its decision on the absence of power on 
the part of the County to enter the printing contract under 
the circumstances, as opposed to a supposed finding that the 
County!s action in entering the contract was contra to a 
specific statutory provision, is seen from the court's con-
cluding paragraph, at p. 131t 
"A contract of the county made with the 
plaintiff for the publication of notice of 
sale of the property, the title to which the 
conservation district had acquired, was clearly 
no part of its corporate duties or powers, and 
under the recognized rules hereinbefore referred 
to must be held to be beyond the powers of the 
county commissioners and as such not binding 
upon the county." 
In related litigation in the United States District 
Court for Utah. 
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The rationale of the Carbon County case was reiterated 
in Thatcher Chemical v. Salt Lake City, 21 U.2d 355, 445 P.2d 
769, 771 (1968), where the court said: 
"One who deals with a municipal corporation 
does so at his own peril. He is presumed to 
know the municipal ordinances controlling the 
administration of public business and the 
limitations on the powers and authority of 
the City officers he is dealing with," 
The Utah rule enunciated in the two above cases clearly is 
the majority rule. See Federal Crop Insurance Corp. v. Merrill, 
332 U.S. 380, 383-385, 68 S. Ct. 1, 2-3; Utah Power & Light 
v. United States, 243 U.S. 389, 37 S. Ct. 387, 391; Denver & 
Salt Lake Ry. Co. v. Moffat Tunnel Improvement District, 35 
F.2d 365, 372 (D. Colo.), mod. on appeal, 45 F.2d 715 (10th 
Cir.); Finch v. Matthews , 443 P.2d 83 3 (Wash.); New Mexico 
v. City of Aztec, 424 P.2d 801, 802 (N. Mex.); Everds Bros. 
v. Gillespie, 126 N.W.2d 274, 277 (la.); County Board of 
Education of Coffee County v. City of Elba, 135 So. 2d 812, 
813 (Ala.); Los Angeles Dredging Co. v. City of Long Beach, 
291 p. 839, 842 (Cal.); McQuillin, supra, § 29-02, p. 214, 
§ 29-10, pp. 252-53; Yokley, 3 Municipal Corporation § 438; 
Rhyne, Charles S., Municipal Law, p. 2 58. 
To alleviate what some have considered to be an unduly 
harsh result, a number of states have passed statutes authorizing 
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entities which have entered into ultra vires contracts to 
make payment thereunder under specified circumstances. See 
e.g. Wisconsin, § 66.295 Stats. (1941); Utah, it should be 
noted, has not passed such a statute. 
Amici (p. 10, amici brief) advance the curious proposi-
tion that in Utah, contracts made in the absence of specific 
statutory authorization (as opposed to the presence of explicit 
prohibitory statutes) may be enforced by a party against a 
public entity. They refer to no language of the Utah Supreme 
Court articulating or even suggesting this rule, but rely on 
their analysis of Baker Lumber Co. v. A. A. Clark, 53 Ut. 336, 
178 P. 764 (1919). In that case, a school district entered 
a contract with a builder for a new school building. This con-
tract was admitted to be perfectly within the powers of the 
school district. (p. 34 9) . When it appeared that the building 
was virtually completed, the school district, being short of 
funds to pay the balance of $7,500 then due and owing on the 
construction contract, issued two warrants for the amount due, 
2 
payable in one year,and bearing the legal rate of interest. 
In litigation brought by a materialman (the builder having gone 
The distinction urged between contracts ultra vires be-
cause they are expressly prohibited and those ultra vires because 
the public cprporation had no power to enter them has been ex-
pressly rejected by the Supreme Courts of Wyoming and Iowa. See 
pp. 20-21, supra. 
2 
The legal rate was 8%. The warrants, for some unexplained 
reason, were drawn to bear interest at 6% but the difference of 2%, 
or $150.0.0, was added to the amount unpaid. p. 349. 
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bankrupt), the school district denied liability for the one 
year's worth of interest on the ground that there was "no 
express provision in the statutes of this state authorizing 
school boards or other public corporations to issue interest-
bearing warrants (p. 349)." The court held the school district 
liable for the interest, but not on the ground suggested by 
amici. The court's ratio decidendi is seen from the following 
language: 
"It is not a question of the school board 
agreeing to pay interest either by warrant 
or otherwise. It is a question of its duty 
on one side and the right of the creditor on 
the other. It is a right that the statute 
gives to any one who has money due and who 
is unable to collect the same." 
The statute referred to is, of course, the statute establishing 
the legal rate of interest. 
Thus, it is seen that the court in Baker held that the 
school district was liable to pay interest at the legal rate 
not because it contracted to do so, but rather because the 
statute imposed an obligation to do so and this obligation 
applied to public as well as to private corporations. It is 
clear from the language of the opinion that if the school district 
had agreed to pay an amount in interest over the legal rate, the 
2 
excess amount would not have been allowed. 
Comp. Laws of Utah, 1907, section 1241. 
2 
Baker can also be explained on the ground that the 
school district had the implied power to contract to pay late 
because it did not have the money to pay on time, this right being 
necessarily implied from its conceded right to contract to build 
the school in the first place. See the Moss case, decided by 
this court, cited on p. 21, supra. 
Amici contend that the doctrine of estoppel operates 
to allow First Equity to enforce the ultra vires purchase 
orders. However, as this Court noted in the Carbon County 
case, supra, estoppel cannot be created by the ultra vires 
acts of public agents or officers. The Utah cases cited by 
amici are inapposite. In Provo City v. Denver & Rio Grande 
Western, 156 F.2d 710 (10th Cir., 1946), the Court construed 
two of the cases cited by the amici here very narrowly. Re-
ferring to Wall vs. Salt Lake City, 50 Utah 593,' 168 P. 766 • 
(1917) and Tooele City v. Elkington, 100 Utah 485, 116 P.2d 
406 (1941) , the court said, at p. 712: 
"These. . . cases, considered in their 
composite effect, seem to make it clear 
that in Utah the principle of estoppel 
in pais is to be applied .very narrowly to 
a city in respect of its right to reopen a 
street for use as a public thoroughfare 
and only in cases where the city acted within 
the ambit of "its legal authority but in an 
irreg'ular way. . ." 
In the appeal at bar, USU did more than act "within the ambit 
of its legal authority, but in an irregular way"; it acted 
completely outside the ambit of its legal authority. 
The other authorities cited by amici are likewise 
inapplicable to an ultra vires contract. The agreement con-
sidered in Beadles v. Smyser, 209 U.S. 393, 404 (1908), was 
expressly said to be not "void for want of power." And the 
treatise cited by amici, 1A Antieau, Municipal Corporation Law, 
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Section 10.10 (1973), states: 
11
. . . the doctrine of estoppel is not 
applied against local governments when the 
contract is ultra vires in the sense of 
being beyond its competence under all 
circumstances." 
D. First Equity Cannot Recover On An Ultra Vires Contract . 
Notwithstanding It May Have Acted As Agent For USU In 
The Five Transactions And Not As Principal 
First Equity and amici contend that even assuming the 
purchase orders to be ultra vires, First Equity is not barred 
from recovering the broker commissions on the five orders or 
the loss it suffered in selling the AMS stock because it was 
USU's agent. This argument was not urged below and should 
therefore be disregarded here. 
Further, the argument is defective in its application 
to both the broker commissions and the alleged loss on the AMS 
stock. As to the broker commissions, First Equity was not an 
agent as to USU; it was the other party to five contracts with 
USU whereby USU was to pay it commissions for its services. 
Since those contracts were ultra vires, they are as unenforceable 
as any other ultra vires contract for the performance of 
services. 
The argument is defective in its application to the loss 
allegedly suffered on the AMS stock because it first assumes 
that First Equity was acting only as the agent for USU. Judicial 
1Davis v. Mulholland, 25 Utah 2d 56, 475 P.2d 834 (1970); 
Pettingill v. Perkins, 2 Utah 2d 266, 272 P.2d 185 (1954). 
notice can be taken of the fact that a broker often acts as 
the agent of the seller as well as for the buyer. USU does 
not concede that First Equity acted only as its agent and 
there is no evidence showing this to be the case. Further 
the argument completely ignores the rationale of the law 
denying recovery on an ultra vires contract as applied to 
the reality of the situation. This court can take judicial 
notice that in ordering stock through a broker, a purchaser 
does not know who the seller is. The broker is the only party 
with which the purchaser has any dealings. Conversely, the 
seller who acts through a broker does not know the identity 
of the buyer. .Substantive rights should not be determined by 
the niceties of the securities industry in designating the broker 
as the agent of the buyer or as the agent of the buyer and seller; 
the buyer's dealings with the broker are the same in every 
case. Surely it cannot be contended that USU is liable 
on an ultra vires order to purchase stock if the broker 
was acting as an agent but is not liable if the broker was 
acting as principal and was selling its own stock to USU. The 
rules of public law controlling this case are not so arbitrary; 
rather they deny recovery on an ultra vires contract on the 
theory that the party actually dealing with the public 
entity is charged with the knowledge that the contract is ultra 
vires. This rationale does not allow a party who directly deals 
with the entity and therefore should be charged with the know-
ledge that the contract is ultra vires to recover on the contract 
The name of the other party to a transaction "brokered" by 
^ 1 ^ ^ + " P l m n f w i c: n n l w n r n u i r l o r l OT» v o m i o o - h (T> 9 7 0 "3 0 f l \ 
on the technicality that he was just acting as an agent and 
that any losses should be borne not by him but by the seller 
of the stock notwithstanding the seller did not know his stock 
was being sold to a public entity which had no power to buy 
itT If such a rule were recognized — and no authority in 
the area of public law is cited to support it.-- the taxpayers 
would lose the protection the ultra vires doctrine was designated 
to give. 
Cases supporting USUfs contention that First Equity, • 
and not the unknown seller, should bear the loss are: 
1. Hirning v. Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis, 
52 F. 2d 382, 82 A.L.R. 297 (8th Cir., 1931). Plaintiff 
receiver of insolvent bank sought to recover as voidable pre-
ferences the sum of remittances made by the bank to defendant 
Federal Reserve Bank in response to the latter sending it 
checks drawn on it. Defendant argued that it was not a creditor 
of plaintiff's bank in receiving remittances, but was merely 
an agent of the other member banks in forwarding their checks 
for collection. The court agreed defendant was not a creditor 
but held it liable nevertheless stating (p. 387): 
11
. . . there was a preference in favor 
of some of the creditors of the Brookings 
Bank growing out of the transfers of the 
currency and the collection items to the 
Reserve Bank. The Reserve Bank participated 
in those transfers. It received the 
1 Nothing in the record suggests that Catron ordered First 
Equity to act as agent; indeed, in two earlier orders, it acted 
as principal. (R. 116). 
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property transferred and it, in turn, 
transferred it to the creditors of the 
Brookings Bank. The action of the Reserve 
Bank as agent helped bring about the 
preference." 
2. Inland Waterways v. Hardee, 100 F.2d 678 (C.A.D.C., 
1938), reversed on other grounds, 309 U.S. 517: 
"When an agent does some act which his principal 
. . . could not authorize, he acts on his own 
responsibility. No valid authority could have 
been given the Corporation to exact an illegal 
pledge; since it did exact such a pledge, it 
is answerable for its tort without regard to 
the status of its principals." 
3. Mayer v. Buchanan, 50 A.2d 595 (D.C., 1946). Plaintiff 
sued defendant for collecting excessive rents. Defendant argued 
he only collected rents as agent. In ruling for plaintiff, the 
court said, at p. 598: 
"By contracting for the payment of rent above 
the legal ceiling, defendant did an unlawful 
act for which his principal could not have given 
him valid authority. When an agent does some-
thing which his principal could not authorize, 
he acts on his own responsibility. Nor is an 
agent excused from liability in such a case be-
cause he acted only as agent." (emphasis added). 
4. Murphy v. Cady, 30 F. Supp. 466 (D. Me., 1939), affmd, 
113 F.2d 988 (1st Cir., 1940). A broker held to be "seller" under 
sec. 12(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 whether acting as agent 
only for seller or as dual agent for seller and buyer. Accord are 
Wilko v. Swan, 127 F. Supp. 55 (S.D.N.Y., 1955); and Boehm v. 
Granger, 181 Misc. 680, 42 N.Y.S. 2d 246 (S. Ct., 1943). 
These cases affirm that First Equity would be barred by the 
"illegality of its own conduct" if the court applied Restatement 
(2nc5 of Agency, §§ 439, 457, cited by amici on pp. 8-9 of their 
briet." They also attirm tnat tioggan v. uanoon, zo uian 
444, 73 P. 542 (1903) is inapplicable because First Equity 
was neither innocent nor free from negligence. 
The maxim that one who deals with a public body does 
so at his peril, so often expressed in ultra vires cases, 
has no regard to whether the person so dealing acts as a princi-
pal or agent as determined by custom of the securities industry, 
POINT II 
THE COURT BELOW CORRECTLY DENIED FIRST 
EQUITY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
A. The Trial Court Properly Held That First Equityfs 
Violation of Regulation T Constituted a Complete 
Defense To The Claim For Damages On The AMS Stock 
And To The Claim For Commissions On The Panelrama 
Stock 
After discussing USU's ultra vires defense, Judge 
Christoffersen stated in his memorandum decision (R. 259): 
• '" This decision is also based on the fact 
that the plaintiff cannot recover damages where 
it did not deliver the securities purchased 
within the time period provided in Regulation . 
T of the Federal Reserve Board. The 
plaintiff concedes that it did not deliver the 
stocks within the 35-day period and concedes 
that it would only be able to collect damages 
for the amount by which the stock decreased in 
value from the trade date until the expiration 
of the 3.5-day delivery period of Regulation T, 
and relies upon Billings Associates Inc. vs. 
Bashaw, 27 AD 124, 276 New York Supplement 
2nd 446. In reading the Billings case, this 
court agrees that was the holding by the 
Intermediate Appeals Court of New York State. 
Amici conveniently omit to cite § 4 67 which bars an 
agent from being indemnified by his principal where the agent 
makes an illegal agreement with the principal to act for him. 
-4 8-
However, in reading Avery vs. Merrill, Lynch, 
328 Federal Supplement 677, the court holds 
and feels that this is a proper ruling, that 
failure to deliver within the thirty-five 
days is a full and complete, and valid defense in 
a state court to attempt to collect damages." 
It is not disputed that delivery of the 5,000 shares of 
Advanced Memory Systems and the 24,100 shares of Panelrama Corpor-
ation was not made within 35 days from the date Catron ordered 
the same. The failure by appellant to deliver this stock within 
that time constituted both a violation on its part of Regulation 
T of the Federal Reserve Board and a breach by it of its 
"contracts" with USU. 
The legal consequence of appellant's failure to deliver 
within 35 days from the purchase date is that USU was entitled 
to refuse both to make payment for the Advanced Memory and to 
pay the commission on the Panelrama stock. This consequence flows 
from each of USU!s claims in defenses--first, that appellant 
violated Regulation T independent of its contract with USU; 
and second, that appellant breached its contract with USU because 
it did not deliver within 35 days as required by the "margin re-
quirements" (Regulation T) of the Federal Reserve Board. 
The breach of contract consisted of not complying with 
all the "rules, regulations, requirements (including margin re-
quirements and customs of the Federal Board. . . (emphasis added) ", 
to which the purchase contracts were made subject by the express 
terms of the "conditions" appearing on the reverse side of the 
written confirmation slip (prepared by First Equity) which 
accompanied each purchase order. (R. 272, 300). 
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Regulation T of the Federal Reserve Board is the regulation 
which embodies the "margin requirements" referred to in 
appellant's confirmation slip. 
1. USU was excused from paying because of First 
Equity's breach of Regulation T. 
First Equity has set forth the relevant provisions of 
the Securities and Exchange Act of 193 4 and Regulation T 
promulgated thereunder on pp. 37-39 of its brief. All that 
needs to be added is that USU maintained a special cash account 
with First Equity (R. 275, 298). It is settled that a 
customer may recover damages from a broker in a civil lawsuit 
for violating Regulation T and, a. fortiori, that a customer 
may lawfully resist payment he would otherwise be obligated to 
make where the broker has violated Regulation T. 
In the leading case of Pearlstein v. Scudder, 429 
F. 2d 1136 (2d Cir., 1970), plaintiff customer purchased some 
bonds from defendant broker with which he maintained a special 
cash account. Payment of the balance due by the customer was 
not made within seven business days of the trade date as 
required by Regulation T. However, the broker did not even 
press for payment of this balance until several months later. 
The customer never paid, whereupon the customer was sold out at 
a substantial loss to him. The customer then brought suit to 
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recover from the broker the difference between what he would 
have received had the broker sold the bonds to his account 
promptly after payment was due and the amount he eventually 
received when he was sold out much later. In holding for the 
customer, the court saidf at p. 1140: 
"We...hold that Pearlstein has a right 
of action against Scudder & German for 
its violation of Section 7. Although the 
congressional committee report which 
recommended the enactment of Section 7 
indicates that the protection of individual 
investors was a purpose only incidental to 
the protection of the overall economy from 
excessive speculation, it has been recognized 
in numerous cases since that time that 
private actions by market investors are a 
highly effective means of protecting the 
economy as a whole from margin violations 
by brokers and dealers (citing authorities)." 
The broker had argued that the customer, Pearlstein, a knowledge-
able investor in addition to being a lawyer, should not be 
allowed to benefit from the broker's illegal extension of credit, 
especially if he knew of the illegality. To this the court 
replied (at p. 1141): 
"However, our holding does not turn on 
Pearlstein!s subjective knowledge of the 
law. In our view the danger of permitting 
a windfall to an unscrupulous investor is 
outweighed by the salutary policing effect 
which the threat of private suits for 
compensatory damages can have upon brokers 
and dealers above and beyond the threats 
of governmental action by the Securities 
and Exchange Commission." 
The broker had further argued that Pearlstein, having benefited 
from the illegal extension of credit, was in pari delicto and 
therefore could not recover. This the court also dismissed, 
saying (at p. 11.41) : 
"...the federally imposed margin requirements 
forbid a broker to extend undue credit but 
do not forbid customers from accepting such 
credit. This fact appears to indicate that 
Congress has placed the responsibility for 
observing margins on the broker, for the 
original need for margin requirements un-
doubtedly derived from the common desire of 
investors to speculate unwisely on credit. 
Moreover, whereas brokers are charged by law 
with knowledge of the margin requirements, 
the extent of an investor's knowledge of 
these rules would frequently be difficult of 
tangible proof." 
In Avery v. Merrill Lynch, 328 F. Supp., 677 (D.C. Dist. 
Ct., 1971), the court followed the Pearlstein rationale under a 
set of facts even harsher to the broker. Defendant broker 
sold some stock short for the customer, a sophisticated in-
vestor. The transaction was conceded to be subject to the 
margin requirements of Regulation T. The customer had at 
the time of the short sale $14,024.57 on deposit in her account 
with the broker. The proceeds from the short sale were 
$22,999.23. Since at the time the margin requirement was 65%, 
the customer should have had in her account $14,949.69 to 
cover the transaction, or $925.12 more than she actually had. 
Under Regulation T, the customer had five business days to 
come up with this needed amount; she did not do so within 
this time. One week after the deadline, the broker liquidated 
the customer's short position at a loss to her of over $8,00.0. 
Plaintiff then brought suit to have the whole transaction de-. 
clared null and void by reason of the defendant's having waited 
a week too long before liquidating. In holding for the 
plaintiff on her motion for summary judgment, the court, after 
reviewing the legislative history behind Section 7, noted it 
was disturbed by the customer's role in the transaction, 
stating, at p. 681: 
"The Court deplores this type of alleged 
investor behavior and were not the mandate 
of Congress so unequivocal and the public 
policy considerations so strong, the Court 
might reach a substantially different 
decision than the one it does." 
Both the Pearlstein and Avery cases involved customers 
who successfully sued their brokers based on margin violations. 
However, the reasoning of these cases applies a fortiori in the 
instant case where USU did not receive the securities within the 
35 day period allowed in a "delivery against payment" situation. 
In both those cases, the broker apparently fulfilled his con-
tractual obligation to the customer within the applicable period; 
the party not fulfilling his contractual obligation was the 
customer. In the case at hand, the broker (First Equity) did 
not deliver the certificates within 35 days. Since USU did not 
have to pay until the certificates arrived, and since it was 
First Equity's responsibility to see that they were delivered 
within 35 days, it is not unjust that USU should not have to 
pay at all. The equity of the customer not having to pay is 
underscored by the fact that a broker is allowed to set up a 
special cash account for a customer and conduct credit trans-
actions for that customer when and only when the customer 
"does not contemplate selling the security prior to making 
such payment." A customer,, in entering into a credit 
transaction with a broker, realizes that the risk of the stock 
declining in value between the trade date and the date of 
payment falls squarely on him. Since (1) he cannot resell the 
stock until he has paid for it; (2) he is entitled to obtain 
delivery before having to pay in a "delivery against payment" 
situation; and (3) he knows that delivery must be made in 
35 daysf it is inequitable to the customer to extend the 
period of risk he has to bear beyond the 35 days, especially 
in the case of stock, the value of which fluctuates so greatly. 
Even absent the 3 5 day provision of the "delivery against 
payment" situation existing in the subject lawsuit, courts have 
held the principles of Pearlstein and Avery applicable to suits 
brought by brokers to recover the amounts owed by their customers. 
In Staley v. Salvesen, 35 District & County 2d 318 (Pa., 1963) , 
plaintiff broker purchased stock for the account of defendant 
customer, then, after unsuccessfully attempting to obtain pay-
ment, sold it out at a loss long after 7 days and sued the customer 
to recover the difference. The Pennsylvania Court, in holding 
for the customer based on the broker's violation of the margin 
requirements, stated, at pp. 323-324: 
"Regulation T is mandatory in character 
and sales of securities to "special cash 
accounts" which are not met by full 
cash payment within the seven days 
prescribed by section 4(c)(2) amount 
to an extension of credit in violation 
of the Regulation T and of section 7(c) 
of the Securities Exchange Act (citation 
omitted). So strong is this policy against 
the unlawful extension and maintenance of 
credit that the broker or dealer cannot 
voluntarily accept payment after the seven 
day period has passed as a substitution for 
the cancellation or liquidation of the 
transaction (citation omitted). And this is 
so even when payment is offered promptly 
after the period applicable to the transaction 
(citation omitted). Payment beyond the pre-
scribed seven-day period cannot be accepted 
even where the delinquent has been pressed for 
payment and where failure to apply to the 
Committee on Business Conduct for an extension 
of time was through inadvertence (citation 
omitted) or where one extension has been 
granted and a further extension has not been 
requested before expiration of the first 
(citation omitted)." 
2. Regulation T provides a complete defense. 
In Avery, the court held that in light of the broker's 
violation of Regulation T, the entire transaction came within 
the ambit of Section 29 of the Securities and Exchange Act of 
1934 (15 U.S.C. § 78 cc(b)) which provides in part: 
"Every contract made in violation of any 
provision of this chapter or any rule or 
regulation thereunder, and every contract 
(including any contract for listing a 
security on an exchange) heretofore or 
hereafter made, the performance of which 
involves the violation of, or the con-
tinuance of any relationship or practice 
in violation of, any provision of this * 
chapter or any rule or regulation there-
^cc.. 
under, shall be void (1) as regards the 
rights of any person who, in violation 
of any such provision, rule or regulation, 
shall have made or engaged in the per-
formance of any such contract.. 
The court in Staley also relied on section 29(b) of the 1934 
Act in holding that the violator broker could not recover • 
from the customer. 
Judge Christofferson was eminently correct in following 
Avery in holding Regulation T to provide a complete and not 
just a partial defense. 
3. USU was excused from paying plaintiff because in 
not making delivery within 35 days, appellant 
breached the purported contracts with USU. 
First Equity's confirmation slips expressly made both 
the Advanced Memory and Panelrama purchase transactions "sub-
ject to the rules, regulations, requirements (including margin 
requirements) and customs of the Federal Reserve Board" and 
the SEC. These confirmation slips were prepared by First 
Equity and the language quoted above appearing thereon is 
stock language, adopted unilaterally and preceded by no 
negotiations with USU or for that matter, with anybody. In 
other words, the confirmation slips are "contracts of adhesion." 
It might be argued that notwithstanding the presence 
of the aforequoted language on the confirmation slips, a 
violation by First Equity of Regulation T does not constitute 
a breach of the contract so as to allow USU to refuse payment; 
but rather than said language was placed there to emphasize the 
customerfs obligations under Regulation T. Such a construction, 
aside from its obvious one-sidedness in favor of the broker, 
flies in the face of an accepted canon of statutory construction, 
namely, that ambiguities caused by the draftsman of a contract 
must be resolved against that party. This canon has been said 
to apply with particular force in the case of a contract of 
adhesion. Pacific Gas and Electric v. G.S. Thomas Drayage & 
Rigging Co., 62 Cal. Rptr. 203, 204 (Cal.Ct.App., 1967), 
susperseded 69 Cal.Rptr. 561, 442 P.2d 641; Am. Jur. 2d 
Contracts § 279, n. 6 (1973 Supplement). 
B. The Court Below Could Have Denied First Equity's 
Motion For Summary Judgment on Other Defenses 
of USU 
Judge Christofferson concluded his memorandum decision 
by stating: 
"In view of the above rulings, the court 
feels that it is unnecessary to comment on 
further defenses of Utah State, such as the 
First Security and Walker Bank and Trust 
Company being agents of the plaintiff and their 
knowledge that Catron had no authority to 
purchase common stock as a defense. The court 
feels that both have merit, but has indicated 
in view of the previous rulings the court 
feels further comment is unnecessary, . . . " 
1. USU was not obligated to pay because USU had withdrawn 
from Catron any authority it had previously conferred 
upon him of which fact First Equity had notice. 
USU submitted evidence (R. 310, 317) that on December 
4, 1972, first the Utah State Board of Higher Education and then 
the Investment Committee of USUfs Institutional Council told 
Catron he should purchase no more common stock, but rather 
should liquidate the portfolio USU then had. Further, it 
is not disputed that on or about December 15, 1972, articles 
appeared in the Logan Herald Journal, Deseret News, and Salt 
Lake Tribune, all of which reported that the Attorney General's 
Office believed it was illegal for USU to purchase stock; 
further , the Herald Journal article reported that the USU 
Administration expressed its willingness to immediately make, 
any required adjustments in the investment program to conform 
with the official Attorney General!s opinion. Likewise, it 
is not disputed that the manager of First Security Bank 
(which acted as the collecting bank for the purchase of the 
Advanced Memory) read an article in the Herald Journal about 
this time concerning what the Attorney General said about the 
legality of USU's investment program. Also the manager of 
Walker Bank & Trust Co. (which served a similar role in 
connection with the purchase of the other four stocks) has 
stated without contradiction that he read an article about this 
time in either the Herald Journal, the Tribune, or Deseret News 
concerning the same subject. (R. 326-328, 337-340, 353-356). 
Therefore, a triable issue of fact has been raised as to 
whether either First Security Bank or Walker Bank, or both of 
them, had notice of enough facts prior to January 17, 1973, 
to put them on inquiry as to whether Catron had authority to 
purchase the five stocks in question. This being so, if 
I 
either bank was an agent of First Equity, notice to that bank 
of Catronfs lack of authority constituted notice to First 
Equity. 
a
* Both First Security Bank and Walker Bank were 
agents of First Equity 
It is not necessary that USU contend that the banks 
were agents only of First Equity as opposed to being dual 
agents of plaintiff and USU. 3 Am. Jur. 2d, Agency, § 234. 
USU contends alternatively (1) there is a triable issue of . 
fact as to whether either bank was an agent of First Equity 
(whether or not it was also an agent of USU), which for 
purposes of defeating First Equity's motion below would 
suffice; and (2) as a matter of law, both banks were agents 
of First Equity with respect to the five purchases made by 
Catron. 
. i • . 
(1) Statutory Scheme. 
Section 7 0A-4-201(1), Utah Code, provides: 
"Unless a contrary intent clearly appears and 
prior to the time that a settlement given 
by a collecting bank for an item is or 
becomes final, the bank is an agent or 
subagent of the owner of the item. . . 
(emphasis added).11 
The fact that Catron chose the banks does not preclude 
them from being appellant's agents. 3 Am. Jur. 2d Agency, 
§§ 17-18; Restatement, Agency, 2d § 15. 
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Section 7 0A-4-105id) states: 
"Collecting bank" means any bank 
handling the item for collection ex-
cept the payor bank.11 
Section 70A-4-104(1)(g), provides: 
"Item" means any instrument for the 
payment of money even though it is not ' 
negotiable but does not include money." 
(2) The banks were "Collecting Banks" 
In Phelan v. University National Bank, 229 N.E. 2nd 
374 (111., 1967), a factual situation identical to ours was 
involved. Plaintiff stock brokers had purchased stock on 
behalf of a customer. Payment was to be made against delivery. 
Plaintiffs delivered the certificates to their bank for 
collection which bank in turn forwarded them to defendant bank 
for collection. Defendant bank unsuccessfully attempted to 
reach the customer to effect collection, then after some days 
returned the certificates unpaid for to the plaintiff \s bank. 
Plaintiffs sold the stock at a loss to themselves then sued 
the defendant bank to recover the losses on the theory that it 
was a payor bank under the Uniform Commercial Code and as 
such had failed to give timely notice of the dishonor of 
drafts drawn on the customer. In holding for the defendant 
bank, the court held that it was not a payor bank but rather a 
collecting bank under th,e Commercial Code. Examing the paper 
work involved, the court noted that the plaintiffs therein had 
their bank submit to defendant bank drafts for collection 
which stated: "To University Bank National Bank. . . a/c 
Gerogia Barlas."; and that the transmittal letter of plaintifffs 
bank to defendant bank stated: "We enclose for collection 
and remittance in Chicago funds only when actually paid." 
The affidavits of Lawrence R. Anderson and Fred H. 
Thompson, read in light of the Phelan case, clearly show that 
the banks acted as collecting banks in the transactions con-
stituting the subject matter of this lawsuit, and therefore 
were agents for First Equity with respect to those transactions 
according to the language of Section 70A-4-201(1). The paper 
work involved in the instant case is even identical to that in 
Phelan (R. 3 05, 307). 
(3) The knowledge of the banks that there was some 
question as to whether Catron was authorized to 
purchase the stock constitutes notice to them 
that he had no authority; such notice is 
imputable to First Equity. 
(a) What constitutes notice. 
The Restatement of Agency 2d states, in § 9(3): 
"A person has notice of a fact if his 
agent has knowledge of the fact, reason 
to know it or should know it, or has 
been given notification of it,under 
circumstances coming within the rules 
applying to the liability of a principal 
because of notice to his agent, (emphasis 
added)." 
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Each of the managers of the banks read one of the newspaper 
articles reporting that the Attorney General believed USU 
had no authority to purchase stock. It is not claimed here 
that the articles gave actual notification to the banks of 
Catronfs lack of authority. USU does claim, however, that 
the banks had reason to know or should have known, based on 
the articles, of this fact. 
(i) Reason to Know. 
Comment d to the above quoted section of the Restatment 
reads: 
"A person has reason to know of a fact 
if he has information from which a person 
of ordinary intelligence, or of the 
superior intelligence which such person 
may have, would infer that the fact in 
question exists or that there is such 
a substantial chance of its existence 
that, if exercising reasonable care with 
reference to the matter in question, his 
action would be predicated upon the 
assumption of its possible existence. . . 
The words "reason to know1' do not necessarily 
import the existence of a duty to others 
to ascertain facts; the words are used both 
where the actor has a duty to another and 
where he would not be acting adequately in 
the protection of his own interests were 
he not to act with reference to the 
facts which he has reason to know." 
The bank managers had read that USU was believed to have no 
authority to purchase stock. A person of ordinary intelligence 
would know that if this were true, Catron would have no 
authority to purchase. This being so, even though the banks 
may not have owed a duty Lo First Equity to ascertain whether 
or not Catron had authority (and this could easily have been 
done by calling up the President or Financial Vice-President 
of USU), the banks nevertheless did not act "adequately in 
the protection of (their) own interests'1 since they did not 
act "with reference to the facts which (they had) reason to 
knowf" i.e. they did not act as if Catron had no authority but 
rather went ahead and collected for the stock certificates. 
(ii) Should Know. 
Comment e to § 9 of the Restatement Agency, 2d reads: 
"A person should know of a fact if a 
person of ordinary prudence and intelli-
gence. . . would ascertain in the per-
formance of his duty to another, that such 
facts exist or that there is such a 
substantial chance of its existence that 
his action would be predicated upon its 
possible existence." 
Persons of at least ordinary prudence and intelligence, like 
the managers of banks, after having read the articles, should 
have ascertained in the performance of their duties to First 
Equity whether Catron did have authority to purchase; or at 
least, there was such a substantial chance that he did not, 
based on the articles, that their actions should have been 
predicated upon the possibility that he did not have authority. 
Despite their reputation for inaccuracy, newspapers 
generally do not carry a story without some basis. And although 
the Attorney General's opinion may still be proven to be erroneous, 
USU, as a state institution, had to be guided by it.; therefore 
it had to revoke Catron's authority to purchase. 
(b) The effect upon his principal of knowledge 
possessed by an agent, 
§ 9(3) of the Restatement, Agency 2d, quoted above, 
refers to the "rules applying to the liability of a principal 
because of notice to his agent." Those rules are found in 
§§ 272-283 (Topic 2, Chapter 8). The general rule, stated 
in § 272, reads: 
" . . . subject to the rules stated in 
this Topic, the liability of a principal 
is affected by the knowledge of an 
agent concerning a matter. . . upon 
which it is his duty to give the principal 
information." 
The comment to § 27 2 makes it clear that the word "knowledge" 
imports the definition of "notice" in § 9(3) . 
In Hunt v. Smith, 25 Cal. App., 3d 807, 101 Cal.Rptr. 
4, 11 (1972), a bank was serving as the collecting bank, and 
thus agent of the defendant, to collect interest and principal 
on a note owing defendant by plaintiff. The court stated that 
the knowledge of the collecting bank was imputed to its 
principal, the defendant. 
(c) First Equity is affected by the knowledge that 
Catron had no authority since the banks should 
have acquired that knowledge. 
Even if this Court holds as a matter of law that the 
banks had no notice, actual or constructive, of Catron's lack 
of authority, First Equity is affected by knowledge of that 
fact under a separate principal of agency law. Restatement 
Agency 2d, § 277, points out that where the principal owes 
a duty to others that care should be exercised in obtaining 
information, knowledge which the agent should have acquired 
in the performance of his duties is imputable to the principal. 
In the case at hand, First Equity had a separate duty to USU 
under ,Riles 746 and 747 of the Philadelphia, Baltimore and 
Washington Exchange of which First Equity is a member (R. 6-10) . 
Buttrey v. Merrill Lynch, 410 F.2d 135 (7th Cir., 1969). 
Those rules, and the duties they impose, appear as Appendix C. 
(d) Conclusion. 
As a matter of law, based on the above principles of 
agency, the banks had "notice" of Catron's lack of authority 
by virtue of their managers having read the articles. At the 
very least, since the "notice" they had was not actual knowledge 
but knowledge they had reason to possess, or should have 
possessed, and since it is always a question of fact as to 
whether one has reason to know, or should know, a particular 
matter, a triable issue of fact existed to defeat First 
Equity!s motion for summary judgment. 
2. There is a triable issue of fact as to whether 
Catron had apparent authority when he ordered 
each of the five stocks in question. 
First Equity!s case appears to rest solely on the 
theory that Catron had apparent authority which had not been 
revoked when he ordered the five stocks. This theory would be 
stronger if it was certain that USU had sent a copy of the 
corporate resolution dated January 20, 1972, to First Equity. 
But as appears from the record, there is a considerable 
factual dispute as to whether First Equity ever received a 
copy (see pp. 10-11, supra). Thus there is atriable issue of 
fact as to whether apparent authority was ever created in 
Catron and if so, whether it was validly terminated. 
(a) Creation of apparent authority. 
It is conceded that "if the agent properly begins 
to deal with a third person and the principal has notice of 
this, the apparent authority to conduct the transactions is 
not terminated by the termination of the agent's authority 
other than incapacity. . . unless the third person has notice 
of it.11 Restatement, Agency 2d, § 129 (emphasis added). 
But based on the facts of this case, summarized below, it is 
at least a triable issue of fact whether both Catron had properly 
begun to deal with First Equity and USU had notice of this. 
The only purchase order Catron had placed with plaintiff 
prior to December 4, when his authority was terminated (R. 309-
310, 317), was for 11,000 shares of Cunningham Arts; and that 
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order had not been fully paid for as of December 4th. (R. 303). 
Further, no one in the USU hierarchy above Catron knew that 
he had placed orders with plaintiff until long after December 
4th. (R. 311-312). 
(b) USUfs duty to inquire. 
In Tintic Delaware Mining v. Salt Lake F. & K. R. Co., 
59 Utah 437, 203 P. 871 (1921), third party creditors sued 
defendant railroad company and some of its directors. The 
suit against the directors proceeded on the theory that they 
were responsible for the corporation's officers having diverted 
from the corporation in breach of a contract between plaintiff 
and the corporation funds in which plaintiff had an interest. 
Plaintiff conceded that the directors knew nothing about the 
contract or the diversion of funds in breach thereof but 
apparently urged liability on their part based on an alleged 
duty to plaintiff to oversee the funds which were diverted 
and alleged violation of that duty. In upholding a judgment 
for the directors, the Supreme Court treated the questions 
as one of fact and found that the record supported the lower 
court's findings. It is thus a question of fact as to whether 
USU had a duty to inquire as to which brokers Catron had been 
dealing with and, if so, whether it breached that duty. See 
also the discussion on what constitutes constructive notice 
on pp. 61-63 above. , 
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(c) Termination of apparent authority. 
. There is a further reason why First Equityfs theory 
based on apparent authority must fail. Section 129 of 
Restatement, Agency 2d , quoted above, points out that the 
apparent authority of Catron could be terminated without 
notice being received by plaintiff if the cause of termination 
was the "incapacity" of Catron. As discussed on pp. 68-71 r 
infra, it is at least triable whether Catron possessed authority 
from USU after December 5th and, therefore, on principles 
of municipal law, was incapable of contracting with First 
Equity thereafter. 
4. USU Has No Legal Obligation To First Equity 
Under Contracts Which Catron Had No Authority 
From USU to Make. 
A separate defense, not commented on by Judge Christoffer-
son, is that even conceding USU had statutory power to authorize 
Catron to purchase stock, USU incurred no legal liability 
if in fact it did not authorize him to do so. The affidavit of 
Dee A. Broadbent attests that Catron1s authority from the 
Institutional Council to purchase stocks had been withdrawn 
prior to the dates he ordered the stock in question. (R. 310,317). 
If this is true (First Equity appears to deny this, but at 
least a triable issue of fact is raised), USU is not liable 
on the contracts Catron purported to make with First Equity 
since .ordinary agency law notwithstanding, USU is not estopped 
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from denying the authority of Catron to purchase stock after 
December 4, 197 2. In 10 McQuillin, Municipal Corporations, 
(1966 Rev. Vol.) § 29.104c, p. 517, it is stated: 
"Although in some instances a con-
trary view has been taken, ordinarily 
a municipality will not be estopped 
to deny the authority of one of its 
officers to make a contract, and the 
fact that the same officer had 
viously made 
municipal: 
does 
Lty 
contracts 
had 
pre-
which the 
recognized 
not estop it from 
authority in the 
deny: 
particular 
as 
mg 
binding 
his 
"instance. 
(emphasis added)." 
McQuillin cites 22 cases from 17 jurisdictions in support of the 
rule that "ordinarily a municipality will not be estopped to 
deny the authority of one of its officers to make a contract." 
Utah is in accord with the general rule. In Petty v. Borg, 106 
Utah 524, 150 P.2d 776 (1944), a procurement officer, who was 
authorized to purchase automobilies for the federal government, 
ordered four station wagons from plaintiff dealer. The govern-
ment paid plaintiff for these. However, the officer also ordered 
a fifth wagon, ostensibly on behalf of the government, but in 
reality for a friend, Borg. On the officer's instructions, 
plaintiff delivered the vehicle to Borg, thinking he was 
authorized to receive it on behalf of the government. When 
the government refused payment on this wagon (Borg had paid the 
officer who then fled with the proceeds), plaintiff sued Borg 
for claim and delivery of the vehicle. Borg, in arguing that 
title had passed to him, urged that the government was estopped 
from denying that the officer had authority to sell it to him. 
In rejecting this, the court stated (p. 780): 
: ". . . the government is not bound 
or estopped by the acts of its officers or 
agents which are not within the scope of 
their authority so the doctrine of 
estoppel is of no aid to the defendant 
here." 
In Tooele City v. Elkington, 100 Utah 485, 493-495, 
Justice Wolfe states, concurring: < 
"I do not know whether the statement that 
individuals dealing with officers should 
be able to rely upon their acts; that 
officers should act within the authority 
granted; and that officers should be held 
to their acts * * * like individuals1 is 
. intended to be a statement of moral respon-
sibility or enunciate a legal principle, 
or whether it means that a municipality whose 
officers act or promise should be held for 
the acts of those officers, like individuals. 
If these expressions are meant to enunciate 
legal principles, I call attention to the 
following: Missouri v. Bank of Missouri, 
45 Mo. 528; Pierce v. United States, 7 Wall, 
666, 19 L.Ed. 169; McQuillin on Municipal 
Corporations, (2nd Ed.) Sec. 519, Page 192; 
Mecham on Public Offices, Sees. 511 and 512, 
P. 336; Wormstead v. City of Lynn, 184 Mass. 
425, 68 N.E. 841; Higginson v. City of Fall 
River, 226 Mass. 423, 115 N.E. 764, 2 A.L. 
R. 1209; City of Enterprise v. J. Rawls, 204, 
Ala. 528, 86 So. 374, 11 A.L.R. 1175. These . 
authorities discuss the duty of an individual 
in dealing with an officer or agent of a city, 
to determine whether he is acting strictly within 
his authority. The principle of 'holding 
out1 does not apply to a municipality. A city 
may be estopped from asserting a claim because 
of the action or non-action of its representative 
body or successive bodies under certain cir-
cumstances, but neither that body nor the city 
is estopped or bound in any way on the theory 
that it has held out its agent as having 
authority which he did not have.11 
Wormstead v. City of Lynn, cited by Justice Wolfe, supra, saw 
the court assume that the agent in question had entered the 
same type of contract on prior occasions and the city had 
paid the contractor pursuant thereto. The court then said, 
at pp. 842-843: 
"The other contention of the plaintiff 
is that the defendant city has held out the 
superintendent of streets as one having 
authority to contract, and is estopped to 
deny that authority as against the plaintiff, 
who has acted on the faith of the practice 
which the city has allowed . . . . the 
decisive answer to the whole contention is 
that the doctrine relied on by him has 
no application where a person enters into 
a contract with a public officer who under-
takes to act for and to bind a municipal 
corporation or other body politic. Such 
a person is bound, at his peril, to as-
certain the extent of the authority of the 
public officer with whom he deals. In such 
a case the money pledged for the payment of the 
contractor is the money of the public, or of 
an ascertained portion of the public; and 
the public is not estopped by a violation of 
duty on the part of public officials, no 
matter how many officials may have been 
concerned in it, and no flatter how long it 
may have continued/" ("eniphas"is added). 
4. Even Assuming, Arguendo, USU had Power to Purchase 
Stock with its Grant Monies, Judge Christofferson's 
Orders Should be Affirmed Because There was no 
Such Money Available to USU to Purchase the Five 
Stocks in Question. 
Assuming that not all of the sources comprising the 
investment pool were unavailable legally for purchasing stock, 
but that grant monies (i.e. those defined in § 53-32-4) could 
be lawfully used for this purpose, this court as a matter of 
law should hold that the uninvested cash in the investment 
pool at the time Catron placed orders for the stock in question 
was grant money only in the event and to the extent that the 
total amount which at that time was already invested in stock 
was less than the total amount contributed
 (to the pool from 
grant sources. By this method of computation, which is 
compelled by the law concerning what money can be invested 
by USU in what securities, Judge Christofferson1s two orders 
should be affirmed as a matter of law since at the time Catron 
ordered the stocks in question from First Equity, it is not 
disputed that USU already had an amount invested in stock 
over ten times as great as the total amount of its grant funds 
(R. 310-311). 
It has been argued, however, that inasmuch as all USU's 
monies had been placed in a common investment pool, it is 
impossible to trace the monies present in the pool at a given 
time to a particular source and therefore this court should 
treat the amount of cash left in the pool at any given time 
as being grant monies. This argument is faulty for the reason 
it disregards sound accounting principles of pooling which would 
allocate any money left in the pool at any given time to the 
various sources of origin in proportion to the amount con-
tributed to the pool from the various sources. 
CONCLUSION 
The Order, below, granting USU's Cross Motion for 
Summary Judgment should be affirmed on the grounds, each and 
all: 
1. USU had no statutory power to purchase stock with 
any funds in its custody; 
2. First Equityfs own violation of Regulation T 
is a complete defense to its claim for losses suffered on the 
AMS stock and its claim for commissions on the Panelrama stock; 
with respect to the claim for commissions on the other three 
stocks (Natomas, Great Basin Petroleum, and Cordura), the 
voluntary cancellation by First Equity of Catron's orders to 
purchase these stocks (as well as the order to buy Panelrama) 
constituted a relinquishment of its right to receive commissions; 
3. As a matter of law, Catron had no authority from 
USU to purchase the stock in question, his authority having 
been revoked prior to his placing orders to buy the same; 
4. As a matter of law, First Equity had notice of the 
revocation of Catron's authority prior to accepting the five 
orders; and 
5. As a matter of law, USU did not have available at the 
time Catron placed the five orders grant monies sufficient to 
pay for the same. 
The Order below denying First Equity's Motion for Summary 
Judgment should be affirmed on one or more of the above 
five grounds in addition to the grounds, each and all: 
1. If any funds in USUfs custody could be used 
legally to purchase stock, a triable issue remains as to 
whether at the time the five orders were placed such funds 
were available to USU sufficient to pay for said orders; 
2. There is a triable issue of fact as to whether 
Catron's authority to purchase stock was revoked; and 
3. There is a triable issue of fact as to whether 
First Equity acquired notice of the revocation of Catron!s 
authority. 
Respectfully submitted, 
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The Language of the 1888 Act Establishing 
USU Refutes the Argument that the Territorial 
Legislature Conferred Power to Invest in Stock 
In examing the above argument, the court should con-
sider the principles of statutory construction set forth on 
pp. 18-22 of respondent's brief and in particular, (1) the common 
law presumption that public bodies may not acquire property or 
spend money for investment or speculation and (2) the canon that 
courts strictly construe the powers of a public body where the 
powers are said to include the power to contract for products 
or services other than those customarily required by public 
bodies. Applying the principles of construction referred to, 
it is obvious that the 18 8 8 Act in no way conferred on the 
school the power to invest in stock or corporate bonds. The 
relevant sections are set forth below (emphasis has been added): 
s. 2. For the purpose of erecting suit-
able school buildings and purchasing land on 
which to conduct agricultural experiments, the 
sum of twenty-five thousand dollars, or so much 
thereof as is necessary, is hereby appropriated 
out of any money in the Territorial treasury not 
otherwise appropriated. 
* * * 
s. 4. The trustees shall elect one of 
their number a president, and shall appoint a 
superintendent, a secretary, and treasurer. 
Said trustees shall take charge of the general 
interests of the institution, and shall have 
power to enact by-laws and rules for the regula-
tion of all its concerns, not inconsistent with 
the laws of the Territory. They shall have the 
general control and supervision of the agricul-
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tural college, the farm pertaining thereto, and 
such lands as may be vested in the college by 
Territorial legislation, of all appropriations 
made by the Territory for the support of the 
same, and also of lands that may hereafter be 
donated by the Territory, or the United States, 
or by any person or corporation, in trust for 
the promotion of agricultural and industrial 
pursuits. . ..." 
* * * 
s. 3. The trustees shall have supervision 
of the erection of the college buildings, and 
shall make all purchases and contracts for said 
buildings in accordance with such plans, draw-
ings and specifications as the said trustees 
shall have adopted. They shall, in all contracts 
entered into, require bonds to be given for the 
faithful performance of the same, and shall keep 
an accurate record of their proceedings, which 
shall embrace copies of all contracts entered 
into, and a minute and accurate record of all 
expenditures,showing the amount paid, to whom 
paid, and for what service rendered, and mater-
ials purchased, and whether paid on account or 
in performance of contract; and for all payments 
made,vouchers shall be taken. . 
* * * 
s. 6. The trustees shall make a report to 
the next general Assembly of the Legislature, 
showing the amount of work done, the condition 
of the buildings, a detailed account of the 
expenditures on the same, the amount of land 
bought, its cost and condition, and the improvements 
thereon." 
The initial appropriation to USU of $25,000 was to be used only 
11
 for the purpose of erecting suitable school buildings and 
purchasing lands on which to conduct agricultural experiments." 
Section 2, supra. The only section of the Act mentioning powers 
to contract is Section 5. By that section, the trustees were 
given specific powers to supervise the erection of college 
buildings, to adopt plans, drawings and specifications for 
those buildings, and to make all purchases and contracts for 
the buildings. Finally, Section. 6 specifies that the report 
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which the trustees must make to the Legislature periodically 
shall show the amount of work done on the buildings, their 
conditions, an accounting of money expended on the buildings, 
and comparable information on land purchased, i.e., amount, 
cost, condition, and improvements. 
The logical consequences of construing the words 
"general control and supervision. . . of all appropriations" 
to include power to invest in stock are that those same words 
must then be construed to grant USU power to invest or speculate 
in anything whatsoever. This fatal flaw in defendants1 argu-
ment has been noted by Judge Aldon Anderson in his opinion in 
Utah State University vs. duPont Walston, Inc., October 1, 
1974, CCH Fed. Sec. Law Rptr. p 94,812.X 
Inasmuch as the initial appropriation over which the 
trustees had "general control and supervision" was to be used 
only for buildings and lands, it is inconceivable that the 
Legislature intended that the trustees should have power to 
invest or speculate in anything. That the legislature did not 
intend to grant such a dangerous power is evidenced by the 
facts (1) that the only section of the Act which confers 
specific powers to contract limits those powers to cont-
"The Court is equally concerned with the amicus curiae 
theory that would give state universities a free hand in all 
investment matters." 
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tracts connected with the erection of college buildings; 
and (2) that the only information the trustees must include 
in their report to the Legislature involves buildings and 
land. 
This court can take judicial notice of the risk 
involved in investing in stock in many if not most companies 
in 1888, let alone in investing in other forms of speculation, 
Yet, if appellant's argument is accepted, the Legislature 
gave USU's trustees a carte blanche to invest appropriated 
monies in anything. Such a contention is unworthy of belief. 
Indeed, applying the general principles of public law 
discussed at pp. 18-22 , supra, the only powers to contract 
which the 18 88 Act conferred are found in Section 5. The 
language of sec. 4, relied on by appellant , gave no power to 
contract, but only the power to audit and otherwise supervise 
the spending of appropriated monies. 
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TITLE OF S.B. 15 8, LAWS OF UTAH 193 9 
(enacting §§ 33-1-1 and 33-1-3) 
An Act Authorizing Insurance Companies, 
Financial Institutions, State, County, and 
Municipal Administrative Departments, 
Boards, Commissions and Officers, Mutual 
Benevolent and Benefit Associations, Fire-
men's Relief and Pension Fund, Police Pen-
sion Fund and Other Pension Funds, Building 
and Loan Associations, Charitable, Educational, 
Eleemosynary and Public Corporations and 
Organizations to Invest in Bonds Issued by 
the United States, Bonds for the Payment of 
Whose Principal and Interest Is Guaranteed 
by the United States or Bonds or Debentures 
of Certain Instrumentalities of the Federal 
Government and the Insured Shares or Accounts 
of Domestic Building and Loan Associations or 
Federal Savings and Loan Associations, and 
Providing That Such Securities Shall Be 
Acceptable As Security for Bonds and as a 
Deposit for Securities When Required by Law. 
PHILADELPHIA-BALTIMORE-
WASHINGTON STOCK EXCHANGE 
RULES 
RULE 747. 
No member organization shall make any brokerage 
transactions for the account of a customer unless, prior to the 
completion thereof, a general partner or an officer who is a 
holder of voting stock in such organization shall have specifica 
approved the opening of such account, provided, however, that 
in the case of branch offices the opening of an account for a 
customer may be approved by the manager of such branch office 
but the action of such branch office manager shall within a 
reasonable time be approved by a general partner or an officer 
who is a holder of voting stock in such organization. The 
member, general partner or officer approving the opening of an 
account shall, prior to giving his approval, be personally 
informed as to the essential facts relative to the customer 
and to the nature of the proposed account and shall indicate 
his approval in writing on a document which will become part 
of the records of his office or organization. 
RULE 746. 
Every member is required either personally or through a 
general partner or an officer who is a holder of voting stock in 
his organization to use due diligence to learn the essential fac 
relative to every customer and to every order or account accepte 
by his organization. 
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